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PATENTS AND GROWTH: EMPIRICAL
EVIDENCE FROM THE STATES*
GLYNN S. LUNNEY, JR.**
In the Uruguay Round, negotiators for the United States
persuaded its trading partners to incorporate uniform minimum
standards for the protection of intellectual property rights
("IPRs") directly into the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. Although individual countries may adopt higher
standards for protection, the agreement on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPs") imposed on
all countries the fairly high standards of protection then existing
in only a relative handful of countries. Proponents of TRIPs
argue that the agreement is trade-related and will prove to
mutually enhance the welfare of countries that are net exporters
of IPR goods, as well as countries that are net-IPR goods
importers. Opponents contend that the measure was mere rent-
seeking by the United States and will prove beneficial only to
countries that are net-IPR exporters. This paper uses the United
States as a natural experiment in an attempt to cast some light on
this debate. The United States has provided uniform federal
patent protection since 1790, yet the patenting activity across
states has varied considerably. The residents of some states
patent more; the residents of other states patent less. Using a
macroeconomic model to explain variations in state economic
performance, this paper finds that, within a regime of uniform
patent protection, patenting by the residents of other states (or
"external patenting") has a positive correlation with a state's per
capita income and gross domestic product. Moreover, when the
states are broken down into quartiles based upon their levels of
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patenting activity, the correlation becomes more positive for
states in the lower patenting quartiles.
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INTRODUCTION
In the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
("Uruguay Round"), negotiators for the United States persuaded its
trading partners to incorporate uniform minimum standards for the
protection of intellectual property rights ("IPRs") directly into the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT").1 Although
1. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33
I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs]. For a summary of the various stories that might
account for the adoption of TRIPs, see, for example, Peter K. Yu, TRIPs and Its
Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369, 371-79 (2006) (offering four stories to
account for the adoption of TRIPs: (i) the bargain narrative where net-IPR importing
countries agreed to TRIPs in return for broader access for their own agriculture products
and textiles in the net IPR-exporting countries; (ii) the coercion narrative where net IPR-
exporting countries forced the net IPR-importing countries to agree to TRIPs using their
superior bargaining power; (iii) the ignorance or paternalism narrative where adopting
more extensive protection for IPR goods was in the self-interest of the net IPR-importing
countries, but they did not realize it; and (iv) the self-interest narrative, where adopting
more extensive IPRs was in the self-interest of the net IPR-importing countries, and they
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individual countries may adopt higher standards for protection,2 the
agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
("TRIPs") imposed on all GATT signatory countries the fairly high
standards of protection then existing in only a relative handful of
countries.3 The adoption of TRIPs may prove desirable, from the
United States' perspective, for two reasons. First, adopting uniformly
high protection for IPRs may increase world economic growth,
allowing the United States to share in a larger pie. So far, however,
empirical studies have shown little or no direct positive correlation
between higher IPR protection and increased growth, and seem to
suggest that a lower level of IPR protection may maximize growth for
lesser-developed countries.4 Second and alternatively, TRIPs may
prove desirable for the United States even if it reduces (or fails to
increase) world economic growth so long as it improves the terms of
trade for the United States as a net exporter of IPR products.
In order to evaluate these alternative justifications for TRIPs,
this Article examines the correlation between patenting and
economic growth for the forty-eight continental U.S. states. Because
federal law provides a uniformly high regime of patent rights within
the United States,5 and because patents list the state of residence of
their inventors,6 I can use the United States' experience as a natural
realized it, but for some reason were unable to accomplish that result domestically without
the external push of TRIPs).
2. This aspect of TRIPs has led some to decry the agreement as a "one-way ratchet,"
allowing member states to increase the level of IPRs from the minimums that TRIPs
requires, but not to decrease the level. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPs-
Round II: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 22 (2004).
3. Professor Kitch, for example, has described TRIPs as requiring other countries to
adopt the level of protection provided for IPRs in the United States. See Edmund W.
Kitch, The Patent Policy of Developing Countries, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 166, 167
(1994) (noting in the introduction that "the GATT agreement requires" signatory
countries to adopt IPRs that "resemble[] the American system"). However, the high level
of IPRs provided in the United States may not be high enough in every respect. An
arbitration panel of the World Trade Organization-the entity responsible for enforcing
TRIPs-has found that the exemption from the public performance right provided for
small businesses in section 110(5) of the United States Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)
(2006), violates TRIPs and the Berne Convention. See Panel Report, United States-
Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, § 7.1, WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/cases-e/dsl60_e.htm (finding that the public
performance exemption for small businesses contained in section 110(5)(b) of the United
States Copyright Act violated TRIPs).
4. See infra notes 14-15, 34-49 and accompanying text.
5. See Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified as amended
at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2006)).
6. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.63(c)(1) (2008) (requiring inventors to list their address as part
of the oath or declaration that they must file in connection with a nonprovisional patent
application, unless the information is provided in the application data sheet).
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experiment. Examining the macroeconomic correlations, if any,
between state income, state income growth, and state patenting
within the United States may suggest who is likely to benefit from a
uniformly high IPR regime.
I. THE EXISTING LITERATURE: PATENTS AND GROWTH
In attempting to justify the adoption of TRIPs, proponents have
focused on establishing that TRIPs will, in one way or another,
promote welfare generally, and that it is not mere rent-seeking that
benefits the net exporters of IPR goods alone.7 Assuming that the
central purpose of GATT is to promote free trade, this general
welfare focus is essential. If I define free trade as either: (i)
reductions in barriers to trade; or (ii) other changes to the legal rules
of international trade that, in either case, are mutually welfare-
enhancing, then, by definition, TRIPs promotes free trade only if it
promotes welfare generally. If it is simply a form of rent-seeking on
behalf of net-IPR exporters, then TRIPs does not promote free trade
and, to that extent, does not belong within the GATT framework.
Proponents of TRIPs have advanced three primary arguments in
an attempt to establish that uniformly high IPRs will likely prove
mutually welfare-enhancing. First, TRIPs proponents have argued
that strong IPRs are an important and direct contributor to a
country's economic growth.' Building on well-known microeconomic
theories concerning free riding, public goods, and the reasons why too
little innovation will occur in the absence of IPRs, this argument
posits that adopting stronger IPRs will tend to ensure that a country's
resources are allocated to the most valuable uses and will thus
promote each country's economic growth.9  Second, TRIPs
proponents have argued that strong IPRs can help attract foreign
direct investment, or capital or technology transfers, from more
technologically advanced countries. ° With the assurance that their
7. See, e.g., John H. Barton, The Economics of TRIPs: International Trade in
Information-Intensive Products, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 473, 475 (2001)
("Consequently, as the WTO and the world move into this new area of regulation, it is
important to examine the extent to which the non-zero-sum mutual benefit assumptions of
traditional free trade theory are satisfied for [information-intensive products].").
8. See, e.g., Kitch, supra note 3, at 176-77.
9. This argument reflects both the ignorance and self-interest accounts offered by
Professor Yu. See Yu, supra note 1, at 375-79.
10. See, e.g., Carlos A. Braga & Carsten Fink, How Stronger Protection of Intellectual
Property Rights Affects International Trade Flows, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
DEVELOPMENT 19, 19-34 (Carsten Fink & Keith E. Maskus eds., 2005); Michael J.
Ferrantino, The Effect of Intellectual Property Rights on International Trade and
1470 [Vol. 87
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intellectual property will be protected, multinational firms can more
readily transfer their intellectual property to a country, build
manufacturing plants that utilize the intellectual property, and train a
native workforce." Third, TRIPs proponents have argued that
uniform IPRs will also encourage established Northern 2 research
facilities to examine uniquely Southern problems, such as malaria and
other tropical diseases. 3 With uniform IPRs, Northern firms can
invest in solving Southern problems, knowing that their resulting
discoveries will receive IPR protection.
To date, the empirical research attempting to establish any one
of these arguments has generally fallen short.14 Perhaps because
Investment, 129 WELTWIRTSCHAFTLICHES ARCHIV 300, 327-29 (1993); Keith E. Maskus
& Denise Eby Konan, Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights: Issues and Exploratory
Results, in ANALYTICAL AND NEGOTIATING ISSUES IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM
401, 439-40 (Alan V. Deardorff & Robert M. Stern eds., 1994).
11. See Jeong-Yeon Lee & Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property Protection and U.S.
Foreign Direct Investment, 78 REV. ECON. & STAT. 181, 185-86 (1996); Pamela J. Smith,
Are Weak Patent Rights a Barrier to U.S. Exports?, 48 J. INT'L ECON. 151, 170 (1999);
Sharmila Vishwasrao, Intellectual Property Rights and the Mode of Technology Transfer,
44 J. DEV. ECON. 381, 399-400 (1994).
12. The "North-South" phrasing is common in economic discussions of development
and international trade and refers to the divide between the generally well-developed
economies of the northern hemisphere and the poorer and far less developed economies
of the southern hemisphere. See Carlos Alberto Primo Braga, The North-South Debate on
Intellectual Property Rights, in GLOBAL RIVALRY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 173,
173-79 (Murray G. Smith ed., 1990); Ishac Diwan & Dani Rodrik, Patents, Appropriate
Technology, and North-South Trade, 30 J. INT'L ECON. 27, 79-47 (1991).
13. See, e.g., Jean 0. Lanjouw & Ian Cockburn, Do Patents Matter?: Empirical
Evidence after GATT 2-3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7495,
2000), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7945.
14. See Braga & Fink, supra note 10, at 34 (finding a correlation between stronger
IPRs and trade generally, but finding no correlation between stronger IPRs and trade in
high technology goods); Ferrantino, supra note 10, at 327-28 (looking for correlations
between a country's decision to join a major international intellectual property treaty and
technology transfer to that country, but finding only limited support for such a
correlation); Edwin Mansfield, Unauthorized Use of Intellectual Property: Effects on
Investment, Technology Transfer, and Innovation, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 107, 114 (Mitchel B.
Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993) (using survey data to examine whether a firm's decision on
the level and nature of direct investment in a foreign country depends upon the firm's
perception of the level of IPRs available in that country and finding that a firm's
perception of "a country's intellectual property rights protection will have little effect on
the total amount invested by U.S. firms in that country," but may affect the nature of the
investment); Maskus & Konan, supra note 10, at 439-40 (searching for, but not finding, a
correlation between a country's level of IPR and foreign direct investment); Lanjouw &
Cockburn, supra note 13, at 29-30 (using survey evidence in an attempt to establish that
Northern firms began investing more heavily in Southern diseases, such as malaria, in
response to TRIPs, but failing to find a clear increase in such investment).
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TRIPs is such a recent development, 5 an empirical link between high
IPRs and welfare improvements for lesser developed countries and
other net IPR importers has eluded researchers. This Article builds
on macroeconomic growth theories and the United States' experience
with uniformly high IPRs in an attempt to define more clearly the
potential winners and losers from a uniformly high IPR regime.
Macroeconomic examination of economic growth over the last
forty years has centered around the Solow or neoclassical model and
various extensions and responses to it.'6 The neoclassical model
posits income as a function of capital, labor, and technology.
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function:
17
Y = K- (0,L) (1)
where Y is real income, K is capital, L is labor, and 0, is, at least
nominally, technology." The coefficients a and 13 represent the
output elasticities of the factor inputs. They indicate the percentage
change in output associated with a given percentage change in factor
input, with constant returns to scale, a+3=1.19 If I assume both
constant returns to scale and competitive factor markets," the
coefficients also equal the relative share of output paid to labor and
capital. The relative shares of national income in the United States
have been quite stable for decades, with labor receiving sixty-five
percent of the total and capital receiving the other thirty-five percent,
and existing empirical studies using the Solow model have generated
corresponding estimates of output elasticities for labor and capital.2
Solow's work has resulted in two primary lines of empirical
inquiry. First, one of the key predictions of the neoclassical model is
15. TRIPs was adopted as part of the GATT framework in 1994. See TRIPs, supra
note 1. However, developing countries were given a five-year period to adopt domestic
intellectual property rights consistent with TRIPs. See id. at art. 65(1)-(2).
16. Robert M. Solow, A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth, 70 Q.J.
ECON. 65 (1956).
17. See id. at 76.
18. As Mankiw, Romer, and Weil have explained, 0, actually reflects "not just
technology but resource endowments, climate, institutions, and so on." N. Gregory
Mankiw, David Romer & David N. Weil, A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic
Growth, 107 Q.J. ECON. 407, 410-11 (1992).
19. With constant returns to scale, a proportional increase in each factor increases
aggregate output by the same proportion.
20. In competitive factor markets, each factor receives as its price its marginal
productivity. See, e.g., Solow, supra note 16, at 79.
21. See Alicia H. Munnell & Leah Cook, How Does Public Infrastructure Affect
Regional Economic Performance?, in IS THERE A SHORTFALL IN PUBLIC CAPITAL
INVESTMENT? 69, 77-80 (Alicia H. Munnell ed., 1990).
[Vol. 871472
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convergence.22 By assuming that returns to capital are diminishing,23
the neoclassical model suggests that initially capital-poor economies
will offer higher returns to capital, attract capital from capital rich
economies, and hence grow more quickly. A corollary of this
convergence hypothesis is that, given the same technology, all
economies with the same investment and labor growth rates will
converge to an identical level of output per worker, regardless of the
initial conditions. A number of empirical studies have tested this
convergence hypothesis. Baumol, for example, tested for
convergence among sixteen industrialized countries over the period
1870-1979.24 To test for convergence, Baumol estimated the
equation:
ln(YN)i,1 979 - ln(YN)i, 1 70 = a + b In(YN)i,18 70 + 6i (2)
where N is each country's population in either 1870 or 1979. Despite
the very simple form of the regression, the convergence coefficient b
was significantly negative, indicating a correlation between higher
initial per capita income and slower growth .2  As De Long has noted,
however, a serious flaw with Baumol's work lies in its sample
selection. 26 By selecting sixteen countries with comparable per capita
incomes as of 1979, a finding of convergence was virtually inevitable.
Moreover, although other studies have supported the
convergence hypothesis, at least for economies expected to share the
same balanced growth path,27 disparity between North and South
22. See, e.g., Paul M. Romer, Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth, 94 J. POL.
ECON. 1002, 1002 (1986) (noting that, in the neoclassical growth model, "[t]he rate of
return on investment and the rate of growth of per capita output are expected to be
decreasing functions of the level of the per capita capital stock. Over time, wage rates and
capital-labor ratios across different countries are expected to converge.").
23. This means that for any given level of labor, increasing the investment of capital
will increase output, but the increase in output will not be as much for higher levels of
capital stock. As a simple example, consider this: giving a worker a shovel to dig holes
will result in a significant increase in the output of holes compared to the worker digging
with his hands or a stick; giving him a second shovel will not increase productivity as much.
24. William J. Baumol, Productivity Growth, Convergence, and Welfare: What the
Long-Run Data Show, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 1072, 1074 (1986).
25. See id. at 1076.
26. J. Bradford DeLong, Productivity Growth, Convergence, and Welfare: Comment,
78 AM. ECON. REV. 1138, 1138-39 (1988).
27. See Robert J. Barro & Xavier Sala-i-Matin, Convergence Across States and
Regions, 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS ECON. ACTIvITY 107, 153 (1992); Douglas Holtz-Eakin,
Solow and the States: Capital Accumulation, Productivity, and Economic Growth, 46
NAT'L TAX J. 425, 429-32, 437 (1993); see also Romer, supra note 22, at 1012-13
(summarizing some of the evidence that supports a convergence hypothesis).
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growth rates persists. Rather than narrow, as the neoclassical model
predicts, the gap in per capita income between North and South has
grown.2" To explain this continuing disparity, Lucas and Romer
developed endogenous2 9 growth models, in which differences in
growth rates could persist.3" In particular, Lucas and Romer focused
on variations in the growth of human capital as a possible explanation
for the continuing disparity in North-South economic growth.31 Their
endogenous growth models posited that a more highly educated work
force would prove more productive.32 As Mankiw, Romer, and Weil
28. As Barro has explained:
In neoclassical models with diminishing returns, such as Solow (1956), Cass (1965)
and Koopmans (1965), a country's per capita growth rate tends to be inversely
related to its starting level of income per person. Therefore, in the absence of
shocks, poor and rich countries would tend to converge in terms of levels of per
capita income. However, this convergence hypothesis seems to be inconsistent
with the cross-country evidence, which indicates that per capita growth rates are
uncorrelated with the starting level of per capita product.
Robert J. Barro, Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries, 106 Q.J. ECON. 407,
407 (1991).
29. "Endogenous" means "arising from within," or internal, and is the opposite of
exogenous or external shocks. A hurricane, such as Katrina, is an exogenous shock that
may have a substantial impact on a geographic region's economic output; the decision of
individuals to invest in the New Orleans recovery, on the other hand, would be an
endogenous variable in a model that attempts to explain such investment decisions. See 2
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 134 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987).
30. Robert E. Lucas, Jr., The Mechanics of Economic Development, 22 J. MONETARY
ECON. 3, 27 (1988); Paul M. Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, 98 J. POL.
ECONOMY S71, S94 (1990).
31. As Paul Romer explained in his conclusion:
The most interesting positive implication of the model is that an economy with a
larger total stock of human capital will experience faster growth. This finding
suggests that free international trade can act to speed up growth. It also suggests a
way to understand what it is about developed economies in the twentieth century
that permitted rates of growth of income per capita that are unprecedented in
human history. The model also suggests that low levels of human capital may help
explain why growth is not observed in underdeveloped economies that are closed
and why a less developed economy with a very large population can still benefit
from economic integration with the rest of the world.
Romer, supra note 30, at S99.
32. See Lucas, supra note 30, at 38; Romer,.supra note 30, at S73.
The growth rate is increasing in the stock of human capital, but it does not depend
on the total size of the labor force or the population. In a limiting case that may
be relevant for historical analysis and for the poorest countries today, if the stock
of human capital is too low, growth may not take place at all.
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have shown,33 with the addition of human capital, the production
function can be written as:
Y = KaH6(0tL)Y (3)
where H is human capital.
Testing the model empirically, Mankiw, Romer, and Weil found
that convergence was conditional.34 Because economic growth also
depended upon growth in human capital, convergence between rich
and poor countries would occur only if human capital grew at similar
rates between rich and poor countries.35 So long as human capital
continued to grow more quickly in rich countries, their work
suggested that the disparity in growth rates between rich and poor
countries would continue.36
Second, having demonstrated that factors aside from labor and
capital might influence economic growth, the notion of conditional
convergence opened the door to the possibility that other factors
might contribute to or influence economic growth. Typically, for each
additional input factor proposed as relevant, researchers simply
added another term to the Cobb-Douglas production function. To
test empirically whether the factor contributed to or influenced
economic growth, economists take the natural log of the Cobb-
Douglas production function to translate it into a linear production
function that can be estimated. Thus, to explore whether public
capital, as well as private capital, played a role in output, Munnell
used data from the forty-eight states to estimate37:
lnQ = lnMFP+alnK+blnL+clnG (4)
where Q was state output; MFP was the level of technology; K was
the stock of private capital; L was the stock of labor; and G was the
stock of public capital.
33. Mankiw et al., supra note 18, at 416.
34. See id. at 421.
35. See Barro, supra note 28, at 409.
Moreover, given the human-capital variables, subsequent growth is substantially
negatively related to the initial level of per capita GDP. Thus, in this modified
sense, the data support the convergence hypothesis of neoclassical growth models.
A poor country tends to grow faster than a rich country, but only for a given
quantity of human capital; that is, only if the poor country's human capital exceeds
the amount that typically accompanies the low level of per capita income.
Id.; see also Mankiw et al., supra note 18, at 416 n.7 (summarizing some of the previous
work that emphasized the importance of human capital in economic growth).
36. See Barro, supra note 28, at 409.
37. See Munnell & Cook, supra note 21, at 74-81.
2009] 1475
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Using this approach, two papers have extended the neoclassical
growth model to expressly include a proxy for the strength of a
country's IPRs.3 s Gould and Gruben, for example, regressed for
ninety-five countries the average annual real per capita gross
domestic product ("GDP") growth rate between 1960 and 1988
against: (1) the log of real GDP per capita in 1960; (2) physical capital
savings, defined as the log of the share of investment in gross
domestic product; (3) a proxy for human capital savings, defined as
the log of secondary-school enrollment rates in 1960; and (4) a proxy
for the strength of IPRs, defined as the log of the index of patent
protection developed by Rapp and Rozek. 9 The Rapp and Rozek
index ranks countries by an integer from one to six4° based on their
patent laws' conformity with the standards set forth in the Guidelines
for Standards for the Protection and Enforcement of Patents of the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce Intellectual Property Task Force,41
where one represents no patent protection and six represents full
conformity. When Gould and Gruben included the natural log of the
Rapp and Rozak index for each country in their regression, they
found the coefficient on the variable was statistically insignificant,
suggesting that there was no correlation between a country's
increased level of IPRs and economic growth.42
Park and Ginarte performed a similar regression. 43 They used
their own index, with values ranging (continuously) from zero to five,
to reflect the increasing strength of IPR protection in a country.44
There are some notable differences between their index and the Rapp
and Rozek index. First, Park and Ginarte used continuous values,
rather than integer values.45 Second, rather than compare coverage to
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Guidelines, they established their
own standard that measures a country's patent protection in five
categories: (1) subject matter coverage; (2) membership in
38. David M. Gould & William C. Gruben, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in
Economic Growth, 48 J. DEV. ECON. 323, 328-38 (1996); Walter G. Park & Carlos
Ginarte, Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Growth, 15 CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y
51,54-56 (1997).
39. Richard T. Rapp & Richard P. Rozek, Benefits and Costs of Intellectual Property
Protection in Developing Countries, J. WORLD TRADE, Oct. 1990, at 75, 79.
40. Actually, the Rapp and Rozak index ranks countries from 0 to 5, but Gould and
Gruben add 1 to the index values in order to take the natural log of the index values. Id.
41. UNITED STATES CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, GUIDELINES FOR STANDARDS FOR
THE PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF PATENTS (1987).
42. Gould & Gruben, supra note 38, at 330.
43. Park & Ginarte, supra note 38, at 54-55.
44. Id. at 52-54.
45. Id. at 53 tbl.1 (reporting values for IPR strength in each country).
1476 [Vol. 87
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international agreements; (3) circumstances where protection is lost;
(4) enforcement; and (5) duration. 46 Despite the different standards,
the indices generate similar proxy values for most countries, as shown
in Table 1.
Table 1: Indices Reflecting Strength of Patent Protection
Country-by-Country47
Park & Rapp & Park & Rapp &
Country Ginarte Rozek Country Ginarte Rozek
(1997) (1990) (1997) (1990)
Algeria 3.24 3 Kenya 2.49 5
Argentina 2.06 2 Korea 3.00 4
Australia 2.84 5 Mauritius 2.37 5
Austria 3.53 5 Mexico 1.30 3
Belgium 3.48 6 Netherlands 3.70 6
Bolivia 1.48 2 New Zealand 2.98 5
Brazil 1.52 2 Nicaragua 0.94 3
Cameroon 2.04 3 Norway 2.92 5
Canada 2.67 5 Pakistan 1.70 4
Central Afr. Rep. 2.04 3 Panama 2.15 3
Chile 1.96 3 Paraguay 1.29 2
Colombia 1.13 3 Peru 0.65 2
Congo 2.04 3 Philippines 2.52 5
Costa Rica 1.84 4 Portugal 1.82 4
Denmark 3.11 6 Rwanda 2.43 5
Ecuador 1.60 2 Senegal 1.99 3
Finland 2.39 5 Singapore 2.16 5
France 3.48 6 South Africa 3.45 6
Germany 3.29 6 Spain 3.53 5
Greece 2.01 5 Sri Lanka 2.76 5
Guatemala 1.15 4 Sweden 2.99 6
India 1.39 2 Switzerland 3.23 6
Ireland 2.46 5 Trinidad/Tobago 2.73 5
Israel 3.53 6 Turkey 1.29 2
Italy 3.50 6 U.K. 3.26 6
Jamaica 2.44 4 U.S.A. 3.52 6
Japan 3.48 5 Uruguay 1.63 4
Jordan 1.52 5 Venezuela 0.75 3
Having created their own index, Park and Ginarte used it to
perform a growth regression similar to that of Gould and Gruben,
regressing the difference between the log of GDP per adult worker in
1990 and in 1960 for sixty countries against: (1) the log of real GDP
per worker in 1960; (2) the log of the capital savings rate; (3) the log
of the human capital savings rate; (4) the log of research and
46. See Park & Ginarte, supra note 38, at 52-54.
47. Both indices range from 1 to 6, with 1 meaning no patent protection and 6
indicating maximum protection. The indices have a correlation of 0.794301, n=58,
p < 0.0001, which indicates a high level of correlation between the two indices.
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development expenditures; (5) the log of the population growth rate;
(6) the log of their IPR index variable; and (7) the log of a variable
representing the degree of market freedom present in the country.48
Their regression yielded a negative IPR coefficient, but as with Gould
and Gruben, the coefficient was statistically insignificant even at the
ten percent level.49  Again, this suggests no correlation between
increasing the level of IPR protection in a country and economic
growth.
Although neither paper found a direct correlation between IPRs
and growth, both papers performed further regressions and found
that increasing IPR was statistically correlated with increased
investments in physical and research capital, ceteris paribus (that is,
holding all other variables constant).50 Because increased capital
investments correlate with increased growth rates, Park and Ginarte
suggested that increased IPRs may increase growth indirectly.51
The existing empirical studies thus provide only limited support
for a relationship between IPRs and growth. Based upon these
studies, even the most optimistic proponent of stronger IPRs can
assert only that "the statistical correlation between IPRs and
economic growth is positive under some circumstances."52 Further, in
the existing literature, there has also been no attempt to incorporate
the role that cross-country variations in technological growth may
play in explaining variations in economic growth. To the contrary,
the usual assumption has been that technological growth does not
vary across countries or across time. Mankiw, Romer, and Weil, for
example, assume that growth in technology, which they denominate g,
is "constant across countries."53 In their view, "g reflects primarily
the advancement of knowledge, which is not country-specific."54
They further assume that technology grows at a constant rate of two
percent annually over the entire period of their study, 1960 to 1985.1'
48. Id. at 54-56.
49. Id.
50. See Gould & Gruben, supra note 38, at 336-38; Park & Ginarte, supra note 38, at
59. Gould and Gruben do not perform such regressions directly, as Park and Ginarte do;
rather, they select a set of instrumental variables for their IPR index and find a correlation
between the estimated IPR index values from their instrumental variables and growth.
51. See Park & Ginarte, supra note 38, at 59.
52. Keith E. Maskus, Lessons from Studying the International Economics of
Intellectual Property Rights, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2219, 2235 (2000).
53. See Mankiw et al., supra note 18, at 410.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 412-13 & n.6.
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The purposes of this Article are therefore two-fold. First, by
incorporating variables that reflect variations between states and over
time in patenting activity, this Article attempts to examine directly
the role that technological innovation, as reflected by patenting
activity, plays in explaining economic growth. Second, by
incorporating variables that reflect: (i) patenting by a state's own
residents ("internal" patenting) and (ii) patenting by the residents of
other states ("external" patenting), this Article attempts to examine
the relative contributions of "domestic" and "foreign" innovative
activity to a state's economic growth. Although differences exist
between how uniformly high IPRs may affect economic growth within
a legally and culturally unified entity such as the United States and
how they may affect growth internationally, a consideration of the
winners and losers within the United States from a uniform patent
regime may cast some light on the likely winners and losers
internationally from TRIPs. 6
II. PATENTS AND GROWTH: EVIDENCE FROM THE UNITED STATES
Because a federal statute defines the scope of patent protection
within the United States, patent protection has been-to a large
extent-uniform across the United States.57 As a result, using data on
56. One of the most significant differences is that most patents issued by the United
States, and almost all valuable patents, are owned by publicly traded corporations. As a
result, if these patents generate economic rents for their owners, an argument can be made
that these rents will, in turn, be passed along to the corporations' shareholders located
throughout the United States, and the patents' benefits will not therefore be isolated to
the particular state where the inventive activities were undertaken. As a practical matter,
this rent redistribution mechanism will not be as uniformly present internationally. Like
most of the other differences, including a common market and legal system, uniform
language, and shared culture within the United States, this difference between the effects
of uniformly high patent protection within the United States and the effects of uniformly
high patent protection internationally should cut in favor of the free trade justification.
That is, if patenting by the residents of other states does not contribute to economic
growth within the continental United States, it is that much more unlikely that foreign
patents contribute to growth internationally.
57. Before the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982, appeals from district court
cases involving patent infringement were heard by the various circuit courts around the
country. Empirical studies have demonstrated some disparity in the percent of patents
found valid and infringed between the circuits. See GLORIA K. KOENIG, PATENT
INVALIDITY: A STATISTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS 4-22 to -23 (1st ed. 1980)
(finding only about 35% of litigated patents held valid for period from 1954 to 1978);
Lawrence Baum, The Federal Courts and Patent Validity: An Analysis of the Record, 56 J.
PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 758, 760 (1974) (noting that between 1921 and 1973 the circuit courts
found nearly two-thirds of adjudicated patents invalid); P.J. Federico, Adjudicated Patents:
1948-54, 38 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 233, 236 (1956) (finding that courts upheld the validity of
patents in only 30% to 40% of the cases in which validity was an issue); Simone A. Rose,
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patenting and growth from the states and an augmented growth
model, I can explore the relationship between both internal and
external patenting on a given state's per capita income, output, and
economic growth. For the purposes of this analysis, "internal"
patenting refers to patents for which the lead inventor resides in the
state-the state's "own" patents. Internal patents can serve both to
improve the productivity of a state's other factor inputs and as a
source of rents, derived from both licensing fees from, and product
sales to, residents of other states. "External" patenting refers to
patents for which the lead inventor resides in another state. External
patents might also improve a state's productivity, either as a direct
source of technical innovation" or through access to products or
services incorporating the externally patented innovation. In either
case, access to external patents may entail a license fee or rent
transfer to the patent-holding state.59 Where a state cannot afford
such access or the market for access otherwise fails, the existence of
an external patent may- foreclose a state from pursuing certain
avenues of technological innovation. However, because patents are,
in theory, only available for novel and nonobvious technological
advances,60 a new patent should not preclude anyone from continuing
to use the preexisting technology.
Given the potential roles of internal and external patents, the
question is whether I can find any economically and statistically
significant correlation between a state's internal patenting, external
patenting, and various measures of a state's economic performance
within a regime of uniformly high IPRs. I begin by identifying the
data used for the analysis.
Patent "Monopolyphobia": A Means of Extinguishing the Fountainhead, 49 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 509, 561-62 (1999) (presenting data reflecting validity rate of 21.63% to 53.57%
from 1944 through 1982).
58. Because all patents are published and by law (35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 1 (2001)) must
include an enabling description of the innovation, residents of one state can use, subject to
the ability to obtain and afford a license, the technical innovations disclosed in the patents
of other states' residents.
59. This is not inevitable. The rents associated with a patent innovation might flow to
the state(s) where the innovation is being practiced, or they might flow to the state(s)
where the owners of the patent reside, which, in the case of a patent owned by a publicly
traded corporation, might be all of the states. If either of these is true, then we should
expect no statistically significant correlation between the place of patenting and growth.
60. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-03 (2006) (detailing the requirements that preclude an individual
from obtaining a valid patent on preexisting technology).
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A. The Data
A state's inventiveness is measured by the number of patents
issued to the state, and the data is taken from a United States Patent
and Trademark Office ("USPTO") publication that lists the number
of patents issued by state for each year since 1883.61 Although a
patent may be assigned to a corporation, the actual inventor(s) must
file for the patent in his, her, or their name(s) and list his, her, or their
state of residence.62 The USPTO report uses the state of residence of
the first named inventor as the state of invention.63 As the first
named inventor on a patent application is usually the lead inventor,
there is likely a strong correlation between the residence of the first
named inventor and the place where the invention occurred.
The Bureau of Economic Analysis ("BEA") provides annual
data on personal income and gross state product for each state.' 4 The
Department of the Census provides data on state population.65  I
converted all dollar values to year 2000 dollars using the consumer
price index from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.66 As a proxy for
human capital, the analysis used the percentage of adults twenty-five
years of age or older who had received at least a bachelor's degree.67
I obtained the educational levels of state populations from the
Statistical Abstract of the United States, but data on educational
61. Patenting data by state since 1963 is available online at http://www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cst-utlh.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2009). For earlier years, see U.S.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, REP. NO. 7, TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT & FORECAST 187-95 tbl.A-2 (1977).
62. Under the Patent Act of 1952, an assignee may apply for a patent on behalf of the
inventor only if the "inventor refuses to execute an application for patent, or cannot be
found or reached after diligent effort." 35 U.S.C. § 118 (2006). Even in such a case, the
assignee must still make application for the patent not in its own name, but "on behalf of
and as agent for the inventor." Id.
63. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., EXTENDED YEAR SET-HISTORIC PATENT
COUNTS BY COUNTRY, STATE, AND YEAR 1 (2007), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/
ac/ido/oeip/taf/cst utlh.htm ("The origin of a patent is determined by the residence of the
first-named inventor.").
64. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional Economic Accounts, http://www.bea.gov/
regional/index.htm#gsp (last visited Apr. 24, 2009) (providing state-by-state data).
65. U.S. Census Bureau, Resident Population-States 1980-2007, tbl.12,
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/tables/09sOO12.pdf (last visited Apr. 24, 2009)
(providing annual state population data since 1981).
66. U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index,
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/ pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt (last visited Apr. 24,2009).
67. For 1960, the data reported is for adults twenty-five years of age or older who
have completed at least four years of college. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional
Economic Accounts, http://www.bea.gov/regionallindex.htm#gsp (last visited Apr. 24,
2009).
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attainment was available only at ten-year intervals.68 I obtained
private and public capital stocks by state directly from Alicia H.
Munnell, but her data covers only the period 1969 through 1985.69
The methodology used to determine public and private capital stocks
on a state-by-state level is described in Munnell.7°
B. Summary of the Regression Analyses Performed
Given the data available, I performed regressions on three
different sets of data. The first set used data averaged over the fifty-
year period from 1951-2000. The second set used annual data,
including gross state product, private capital and public capital, labor,
and patenting from 1969 through 1986. The third set focused on
longer term economic relationships and therefore used averages for
per capita income, human capital, and patenting over six ten-year
periods, 1946-1955, 1956-1965, 1966-1975, 1976-1985, 1986-1995, and
1996-2005.
Moreover, for each set of data, I performed two different types
of regressions. The first type pools data for all forty-eight continental
states and implicitly assumes that the growth relationship between
capital, human capital, labor, and patenting and economic output is
constant across the states. The second type divides the forty-eight
states into patenting quartiles and thereby allows the relationship
between patenting and economic output to vary between those states
with high levels of patenting and those with lower levels of patenting.
III. PATENTS AND GROWTH: POOLED REGRESSIONS
A. A Preliminary Look with Fifty-Year Averages: Patents and the
Role of Convergence
Having described the data, I begin with a preliminary look at the
relationship between a state's patenting and its economic growth over
the last half of the twentieth century, from 1951 through 2000. Over
that period, the states have exhibited sharply varying levels of
patenting, ranging from the State of Mississippi with an average of
3.22 patents issued annually per one-hundred-thousand population
("PPK") to the State of Delaware with an average of 72.63 PPK
68. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S., TABLE 225-
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT BY STATE: 1990 TO 2006 (2009), http://www.census.gov/
compendia/statab/tables/09s0225.pdf (last visited Apr. 24, 2009).
69. See Munnell & Cook, supra note 21, at 73 tbl.4.
70. Id.
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annually. If I regress average annual economic growth rate71 against
average annual patenting over the period 1951-2000, pooling the
forty-eight continental states, and without accounting for other
factors, the coefficient on patenting is negative and statistically
significant, b=-0.000065 (p=0.078), as Figure 1 reflects.
Figure 1. Average Annual Growth Rate Versus Average
Annual Patents Per One-Hundred-Thousand Population
(PPK): 1951-2000
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My initial check of the partial correlation between increased
patenting and growth thus suggests a negative correlation between
increased patenting and economic growth." However, as we have
seen, a state's growth will undoubtedly depend on factors other than
the amount of patenting alone. Thus, the question therefore arises
whether some other factor is causing the seemingly negative
correlation.
When I look at which states are patenting, I find that generally
those states with higher per capita income in 1950 patented more
frequently, as Figure 2 reflects.
71. Economic growth is defined here as the average annual growth in nominal per
capita income from 1951-2000, using nominal per capita income data by state from the
BEA.
72. If the top and bottom five patenting states over the period are omitted from the
regression, the coefficient becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero, b=-0.000095
(p=0.215).
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Figure 2. A verage Annual PPK: 1951-2000 Versus Per
Capita Income in 1950
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Thus, the wealthiest states patented more often. While I expect
patenting to be positively correlated with economic growth, I expect
states with higher initial per capita income to grow more slowly,
reflecting convergence. To isolate the respective roles of patenting
and convergence in economic growth, I begin with Baumol's 1986
model augmented by human capital and a state's per capita level of
patenting activity. I therefore estimate:
y = a+bln(yi) +ckh+dt +6 (5)
where:
y is a state's average annual growth in real per capita income
from 1951 through 2000;
y, is the state's initial per capita income in 1951 (in year 2000
dollars) and represents the convergence criteria;
kh is the state's average annual growth rate in human capital
from 1950 through 2000, where human capital is defined as the
percentage of state residents over the age of twenty-five years
who have obtained at least a bachelor's degree;
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and t is the average annual number of per capita patents
issued to a lead inventor resident in the state from 1951 through
2000.73
In addition, to get some sense for the respective roles of internal
and external patenting, an additional regression was performed which
included the variable t,. This variable, tu,, is defined as the average
number of patents issued annually to residents of the United States,
other than the state at issue, divided by the relevant state's population
over the period from 1951 through 2000.
The existing theoretical and empirical work on growth suggests
that the convergence coefficient, b, should be negative, and that the
human capital coefficient, c, should be positive. In predicting the sign
on the coefficient for internal patenting, two possibilities exist. If, as
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil assume,74 the knowledge reflected in
patented technological advances remains fundamentally
nonexcludable, then a state's own patenting should not explain why
that state grew more or less quickly than other states. If, despite the
patent system, knowledge remains nonexcludable, then the patented
technological advances of one state are immediately and freely
available to all. I would therefore expect the coefficient on internal
patenting, d, to be statistically insignificant. On the other hand, if I
assume that the patent system works as intended and does secure to
the patent holder some degree of exclusive control over the
knowledge a patent reflects, then I would expect the coefficient on
internal patenting to be positive.
With respect to external patenting, there is again the question of
whether the patent system works as intended and grants a patentee
some degree of exclusive control over the patented knowledge. If it
does not, and patenting activity is simply a proxy for the (necessarily)
non-state specific advancement of knowledge, then the coefficient on
external patenting should be positive. On the other hand, if the
coefficient on internal patenting is positive, suggesting that the patent
system does provide the excludability it intends, then a free-trade
view of TRIPs would suggest that the external patenting coefficient
should also be positive. Within the structure of uniformly high patent
rights that federal law creates, technological advances should flow
73. In contrast to the human capital data, patenting is already a rate variable-the
number of patents issued annually reflect the additions to the technology stock in a given
year. As a result, the regressions use the average annual patenting rather than attempt to
concoct a growth variable from the annual patenting data.
74. See supra text accompanying note 53.
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readily from one state to another, allowing one state to benefit from
the technological advances of the others.
In the light of these expectations, four equations were estimated
using pooled income, human capital, and patenting data for the forty-
eight continental states. The first equation estimated contains the
convergence criteria and human capital growth only. To this basic
regression, the second adds internal patenting only, the third adds
internal and external patenting, and the fourth adds external
patenting only. Table 2 summarizes the results, with p values75 in
parentheses.76
Table 2: Growth Regression with Convergence Criteria, Human
Capital, and Patenting
Dependent Variable: Average Annual Growth in Real Per Capita
Income, 1951-2000
Regressor (1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 0.08246 0.11607 0.11505 0.08904Intercept (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001)
0.00828 0.01149 0.0112 -0.00829
n yi (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001)
0.33618 0.30527 0.27075 0.28922
kh (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0011) (0.0011)
7.92409 7.1970
t -- (0.004) (0.0079)
-0.01679 -0.02111
tus .. (0.0871) (0.0443)
Adj. R2  0.652 0.705 0.719 0.675
75. A p value indicates the coefficient's level of statistical significance directly. Thus,
if p=0.1, the coefficient is statistically significant at the ten percent level-that is, a
coefficient whose actual value was zero would take on the calculated value due to random
statistical variation only ten percent of the time. Similarly, if p=0.01, the coefficient is
statistically significant at the one percent level and would arise due to random variation
only one percent of the time.
76. In Table 2, In yi is the natural log of real per capita income in 1950; kh is the
state's average annual growth rate in human capital from 1950 through 2000; t is the
average annual number of per capita patents issued to a lead inventor resident in the state
from 1951 through 2000; t, is the average number of patents issued annually to residents
of the United States, other than the state at issue, divided by the population of the state at
issue; p values are in parentheses. The adjusted R' value reported at the bottom of the
Table identifies the percentage of variation in the states' average annual growth in real per
capita income accounted for by the variables included in the regression. Thus, the four
variables included in the full regression in Column 3 account for 71.9% of the variation in
the forty-eight states' average annual growth in real per capita income over the period
from 1951 to 2000.
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As Table 2 reflects, all coefficients are statistically significant at
the one percent level, except for the coefficient on tu ,, which is
statistically significant at the ten percent level in the full regression
(Column 3) and at the five percent level when internal patenting is
omitted from the regression (Column 4). Multicollinearity does not
appear to be a problem.77 Consistent with the existing literature on
convergence, the convergence coefficient is significant and negative.
In the full regression (Column 3), a one percent increase in initial per
capita income was associated with 1.12 percentage point reduction in
average growth, ceteris paribus. Also consistent with the existing
literature, the coefficient on human capital growth is significant and
positive. In the full regression (Column 3), a one percentage point
increase in the human capital growth rate is associated with a 0.27
percentage point increase in the growth rate of real per capita
income, ceteris paribus.
The first patent coefficient, internal patenting, t, is positively
correlated with a state's economic growth rate. In the full regression
(Column 3), an increase of one in a state's average annual patenting
per capita is associated with a 719.7 percentage point increase in the
state's growth, or to put the scale in more attainable terms, an
increase of one in a state's average patenting per one hundred
thousand population is associated with a 0.007197 percentage point
increase in the state's growth, ceteris paribus. This result tends to
suggest that the knowledge reflected in a patent can remain state-
specific and tends to reject the assumption of Mankiw, Romer, and
Weil that knowledge is not country-, or in this case, state-specific, at
least in the presence of a uniform patent regime.
A question remains as to why the partial correlation shown in
Figure 1, regressing average growth against average annual patents
per one-hundred-thousand population, was negative. The regression
results in Table 2 suggest that the negative partial correlation arises
77. Multicollinearity refers to a high level of correlation between two or more of the
regressors. It occurs when two variables essentially capture the same data. I checked for
multicollinearity both by examining the correlation between the regressors and using the
auxiliary regression technique. The absolute value of the correlation: (i) between average
annual growth in human capital and average external patents per capita was 0.30; (ii)
between average annual growth in human capital and average internal patents per capita
was 0.189; and (iii) between average annual internal and external patents per capita was
0.058. I ran three auxiliary regressions, regressing average annual growth in human
capital, internal patenting, and external patenting individually, each against the remaining
right-hand side variables. The adjusted R2s for these auxiliary regressions were 0.205,
0.402, and 0.053 respectively. These R2 values for the auxiliary regressions are much
smaller than the R' values for our main regressions, suggesting that multicollinearity is not
a problem. Also, the estimated coefficients are robust across model specifications.
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because: (1) initially wealthier states patent more often; (2)
convergence causes initially wealthier states to grow more slowly; and
(3) for the data set studied, the negative convergence effects
outweighed the positive effects from higher levels of internal
patenting. To illustrate, consider the roles of convergence and
patenting on the growth rates of the five states with the highest level
of annual patenting and the five states with the lowest level of annual
patenting over the period 1951-2000. The five states with the highest
levels of annual patenting were Delaware, Connecticut, New Jersey,
Massachusetts, and Illinois, with an average annual patent per capita
of 0.000473. The five states with the lowest levels of annual patenting
were North Dakota, Alabama, South Dakota, Arkansas, and
Mississippi, with an average annual patent per capita of 0.0000515.
However, the top five patenting states had a much higher per capita
income in 1951 than the bottom patenting states: $13,452.79 versus
$7,674.82 (in year 2000 dollars). If all else were constant between
these states, I would expect, using the full regression results (Column
3), per capita income for the top five patenting states to grow 0.6288
percentage points slower than the bottom five due to convergence
alone.78 However, holding all else constant, I would also expect the
top five patenting states to grow 0.303 percentage points faster than
the bottom five due to increased patenting.79 Internal patenting is
thus associated with increased growth, but it does not outweigh the
slower growth associated with convergence.
The association between internal patenting and growth also
appears to be economically significant, comparable in magnitude to
the association between growth rates in per capita income and human
capital. Using the same "top-five-versus-bottom-five" approach, the
five states with the fastest growth in human capital from 1951 to 2000
were Arkansas, Alabama, Minnesota, Tennessee, and Kentucky, with
an average annual growth rate in human capital of 3.49 percent. The
five states with the slowest growth in human capital were Nevada,
Wyoming, Indiana, Delaware, and Arizona, with an average annual
growth rate in human capital of 2.26 percent. If all else were constant
between these states, I would expect, using the full regression results
(Column 3), per capita income for the top five states in human capital
78. The difference in growth was obtained by multiplying the difference in the natural
logs of the initial per capita income by the convergence coefficient from Column 3 of
Table 2: -0.0112*[ln(13,452.79)-ln(7,674.82)]=-0.6286.
79. The difference in growth was obtained by multiplying the difference in patenting
levels for the top and bottom patenting states by the internal patenting coefficient from
Column 3 of Table 2: (0.000473-0.0000515)*7.197=0.00303.
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growth to grow 0.333 percentage points faster than the bottom five
states due to their higher growth rate in human capital.80 Relative to
the bottom five states in each category, the increase in per capita
income growth for the top five states in human capital growth was, at
0.333 percentage points, comparable to the 0.303 percentage points
increase for the top five states in patenting. This suggests that the
correlation between patenting and growth is not merely statistically
significant, but also economically significant.
In contrast to the positive correlation between internal patenting
and growth, external patenting is negatively correlated with a state's
economic growth. In the full regression (Column 3), an increase by
one in the average number of patents issued annually to residents of
the United States, other than the state at issue, is associated with a
1.679 percentage point reduction in growth, all else constant. This
suggests that although every state has, at least in theory, access to the
new technology other states have patented, patenting by other states
does not increase, but rather reduces, a state's growth rate in per
capita income.
It is not self-evident why the coefficient on external patenting
would be negative. The simplest explanation is that licensing or
purchasing products that incorporate the externally patented
innovation entails a rent transfer out of state, and thus serves as a
drag on a state's economic growth. However, a firm's decision to
license, rather than invent around, an external patent presumably
indicates a rational, self-interested decision. To the extent that the
decision to license increases the firm's utility, the decision should
promote, rather than reduce, the state's economic well-being. Two
possibilities, nevertheless, remain for the negative coefficient: (1)
foreclosure and (2) dependence.
First, external patents may serve to foreclose certain avenues of
innovation or economic development. Foreclosure may occur in
either a strong or weak form. In its strong form, foreclosure may
reflect instances of bargaining difficulties or other instances of market
failure that simply preclude licensing of an external innovation. Or,
alternatively, it may represent instances where a foreign firm holds a
patent simply to block development of competing products, without
any intent to exploit or allow another to exploit the patented
innovation. If such instances of strong foreclosure are sufficiently
80. The difference in growth was obtained by multiplying the difference in human
growth rates for the top and bottom states in human capital growth by the human capital
coefficient from Column 3 of Table 2: 0.27075*(0.0349*0.0226)=0.00333.
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common, they could explain the negative coefficient on external
patenting. Although a possible contributor in some instances to the
negative coefficient on external patenting, the strong foreclosure
hypothesis is difficult to reconcile with the positive coefficient on
internal patenting. The positive coefficient on internal patenting
suggests that patents contribute to the home state's growth and are
thus actively exploited, at least on average. Perhaps internal patents
contribute to a state's growth by serving as blocking devices that
insulate a domestic firm from the development of foreign
competition, but that explanation is not entirely satisfactory. While
patents are sometimes used merely to block others from developing a
given technology, it seems unlikely that such use or market failure in
the licensing market more generally is sufficiently common to explain
the negative coefficient on external patenting.
Rather than strong foreclosure, external patenting might also
reflect a weak foreclosure. If I think of the competitive process as a
race, where the winner obtains a patent and hence the right to obtain
the rents associated with a given product innovation, external
patenting may reflect instances where a domestic firm has lost the
race. In this case, foreclosure does not refer to an inability to obtain
access to the innovation but the lost opportunity to collect the rents
associated with the externally patented innovation. Here, the sign on
external patenting is negative because resources are invested in an
attempt to win the race, but upon losing the race, those resources
become unproductive. In either its strong or weak form, the
foreclosure theory is consistent with the negative coefficient on
external patenting.
Second, and alternatively, licensing of foreign technology, while
utility-maximizing for the particular firm at issue, may involve a
negative externality for the state as a whole. If private capital or
internal patenting has increasing returns to scale-the returns for
which are external to the individual actor, but internal to the state as
a whole-then a firm's decision to license an external patent, while
welfare-maximizing for the firm, may not be for the state as a whole.
For example, three domestic firms may each be considering whether
to license foreign technology or invent around the foreign patent. For
each of the firms individually, it is less expensive to license than to
invent around. Thus, taking a license is individually rational.
However, if the three firms shared the cost, inventing around would
be less expensive than licensing. The individual decisions to license
thus entail a negative externality for the state as a whole. If the
negative externality reflected in this example, or a similar negative
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externality, represents a common consequence of licensing external
patents, then the practice of licensing external patents may entail not
only these externality costs associated with discrete licenses, but may
breed a cycle of dependence on foreign patents. If I assume that a
state's ability to undertake future innovation or the cost of such
innovation depends upon a state's active role in past innovation in the
field, then licensing external patents may impair the state's ability to
undertake future innovation in the field. In making the decision to
license an external patent, rather than invent around, a domestic firm
will bear only its own costs of licensing and not the similar cost to
other domestic firms. As a result, any one domestic firm is unlikely to
bear the full costs of the state's dependence on external patenting,
suggesting that licensing of external patents will often entail a
negative externality. In any event, whatever its precise nature, such a
dependence or negative externality hypothesis is consistent with the
long-term, statistically significant negative correlation between
external patents and growth.
Before placing too much reliance on the results of this initial set
of regressions, however, two difficulties must be acknowledged. First,
in an open economy, such as the continental United States, there is
likely to be considerable factor mobility.8 An endogeneity problem
therefore arises in the first regression. Higher per capita patenting or
more rapid human capital growth may be due to factor movement
toward states with higher growth rates in per capita income. This
endogeneity problem creates a problem for causal inferences-I
cannot say whether higher per capita patenting leads to higher growth
rates or whether higher growth rates lead to higher per capita
patenting-and also biases our regression results. Second, equation
(5) omits any variation between the states in private capital
accumulation. This omission, given the likely importance private
capital accumulation plays in explaining cross-state variation in per
capita income growth rates, creates a risk of omitted variable bias in
the parameter estimates. To address these concerns, I performed two
additional sets of regressions.
B. A Second Look with Annual Data: Patenting and Capital
To avoid the problems of omitted variable bias and endogeneity,
the first additional set of regressions expressly adds capital to the
81. Factor mobility refers to the physical and legal ability of moving capital or labor
from one state to another.
2009] 1491
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
regression and uses lagged values82 for most of the independent
variables. To exploit the information in Munnell's data on state-by-
state private and public capital, I can augment her basic equation with
internal and external patenting. I therefore estimate:
ln(Q,)=a+blnK,-, +clnL, +dlnG,_1 +elnT,-, +flnT,_- +glnTeg,, , +e (6)
where:
Q, is the state's real economic output, measured as gross state
product, in each year from 1970 through 1986;
K,, is the state's private capital stock with a one-year lag;
L, is the state's labor supply, measured as total employment on
nonagricultural payrolls from the Bureau of Labor;
G,, is the state's public capital stock with a one-year lag;
T,., is the state's internal patenting with a one-year lag;
T,,., is the number of patents issued to residents of the United
States, other than the state at issue, with a one-year lag; and
T,,,, is the number of patents issued to residents of a state's
geographic region, other than the state at issue, with a one-year
lag.
In addition to the external patenting by residents of the United
States as a whole, I also included a variable reflecting external
patenting by the residents of states in the same economic region,
Te ,,_. 83  I included this variable to examine whether geographic
proximity changes the role of external patenting. Beginning with the
work of Jaffe, Henderson, and Trajtenberg, a literature has developed
using patent citation data to trace information flows.84 One of the key
findings from these studies is a high degree of geographic
82. In my first regression, the endogeneity problem arises because both the dependent
variable (growth in real per capita income) and the independent regressors (growth in
human capital and per capita internal and external patenting) cover the same fifty-year
time period, 1951-2000. Economists typically use lagged variables to address this
problem. Thus, rather than look at whether there is a correlation between a state's
economic output and patenting in the same year, I examine whether patenting in one year
is correlated with the economic output in the next year. This technique solves both the
dual causality problem, following the intuition that past events influence the future rather
than the other way around, and the statistical problem of biased coefficients by eliminating
the correlation between the lagged regressor and the error term associated with the
dependent variable.
83. In identifying states in the same geographic regions for purposes of this external
regional patenting variable, I follow the BEA's definition of geographic regions. See
Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional Economic Accounts, BEA Regions,
http://www.bea.gov/regional/docs/regions.cfm (last visited Apr. 24, 2009).
84. Adam B. Jaffe et al., Geographic Localization of Knowledge Spillovers as
Evidenced by Patent Citations, 108 Q.J. ECON. 577, 577-98 (1993).
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localization." Patents tend to cite prior art patents from their own
geographic area, suggesting that knowledge remains localized.86
However, Alcdicer and Gittelman have questioned whether these
results are reliable." As they show, many of the citations found in
patents are inserted by the patent examiner or by the inventor's
attorney, rather than by the inventor."8 For that reason, aggregate
citation data may not reflect knowledge flows so much as they reflect
the written and unwritten rules governing patent practice. Because
the regional patenting variable in this study is not susceptible to such
bias, including it in the regression may help address the question of
geographic spillovers.
The equation is estimated using pooled annual data for the forty-
eight continental states from 1970 through 1986. Following Munnell,
one year lags are used on private and public capital and the patenting
data in order to address the endogeneity problem that might
otherwise arise in an open economy. Three additional regressions
were performed as robustness checks, the first omitting Tg,,
reported as Column 3 in Table 3, the second omitting Ts,,-,89 and the
third omitting both external patenting variables, reported as Column
2 in Table 3. A regression of private capital and employment alone
was also performed in order to compare the output elasticities of
these factors to the historic norms. Table 3 summarizes the results.9°
85. Giovanni Peri, Determinants of Knowledge Flows and Their Effects on Innovation,
87 REV. ECON. & STAT. 308, 320 (2005) (using patent citation data to trace the flow of
information and finding that "only 20% of the knowledge generated in the average region
flows out of it").
86. See Jaffe et al., supra note 84, at 591 ("Before moving on, the results on the extent
of localization can be summarized as follows. For citations observed by 1989 of 1980
patents, there is a clear pattern of localization at the country, state, and SMSA levels.").
87. Juan Alcfcer & Michelle Gittelman, Patent Citations as a Measure of Knowledge
Flows: The Influence of Examiner Citations, 88 REV. ECON. & STATS. 774, 774 (2006).
88. See id. (finding that examiners account for sixty-three percent of the citation in the
average patent).
89. As this was merely a robustness check, I omitted the results from this regression
from Table 3. There were no statistically significant differences in the coefficient results
from this regression.
90. For Table 3, Q, is the state's real economic output, measured as gross state
product, in each year from 1970 through 1986; K,_, is the state's private capital stock with a
one-year lag; L, is the state's labor supply, measured as total employment on
nonagricultural payrolls from the Bureau of Labor; G,, is the state's public capital stock
with a one-year lag; T,-, is the state's internal patenting with a one-year lag; T..,-, is the
number of patents issued to residents of the United States, other than the state at issue,
with a one-year lag; and T,,,.,, is the number of patents issued to residents of a state's
geographic region, other than the state at issue, with a one-year lag; and p values are in
parentheses.
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Table 3: State Output as a Function of Public and Private Capital,
Labor, and Patenting
Dependent Variable: Log of Real Annual State Output, 1970-1986
Regressor (1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 1.945 1.731 2.798 2.839Intercept (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001)
In K.,0.351 0.368 0.367 0.357IK,,(< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001)
1n L, 0.696 0.506 0.488 0.494IL,(< .0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001)
In Go 0.0957 0.100 0.103In G,., (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001)
1n T, 0.0726 0.0819 0.0841In T __(< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001)
In T.,, -0.0967 -0.0830In T_., _(< 0.0001) (< 0.0001)
-0.0212in T,,,,, (< 0.0001)
Adj. R 2  0.9917 0.9940 0.9942 0.9944
No. Obs. 816 816 816 816
As Table 3 reflects, all coefficients were statistically significant at the
one percent level.
In the first and simplest regression, I included only private
capital and labor as explanatory variables, and as the results reported
in Column 1 reflect, this regression generates output elasticities for
these factors close to the historic 35-65 labor-capital split of national
income. The two coefficients also sum to 1.046, which is statistically
indistinguishable from the common assumption of constant returns to
scale.91
When I add the patenting variables, my regression results for the
annual data confirm the results obtained in my initial regression for
the fifty-year averaged data. Increased internal patenting is
correlated with increased output; external patenting is associated with
reduced output. Here, the coefficients reflect the output elasticities
of these factors. In other words, using the full regression results
reported in Column 4, a 1% increase in a state's level of internal
91. A separate regression was performed that included a constant returns to scale
restriction. For the restriction, /1, 813]=176.69, with ap value of < 0.0001.
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patenting is associated with a 0.0841% increase in state output, ceteris
paribus. Similarly, holding all else constant, a 1% increase in external
United States patenting, or in external regional patenting, is
associated with a 0.083%, or a 0.0212%, respectively, decrease in a
given state's output.
When I consider the regressions which include patenting, the
output elasticities of the factor inputs sum to 1.043 with internal
patenting only (Column 2, sum of coefficients on labor, public and
private capital, and internal patenting), and is again statistically
indistinguishable from constant returns to scale.92 In contrast, when
external patenting is included, the coefficients sum to 0.941 with T,_,
alone (Column 3, sum of coefficients), and to 0.936 with both external
patenting variables (Column 4, sum of coefficients), but these results
are again statistically indistinguishable from constant returns to
scale. 93 Moreover, it is also interesting to note that the magnitude of
the positive output elasticity of internal patenting (0.0841, from
Column 4) is just slightly more than the absolute value of the negative
output elasticity of external U.S. patenting (-0.0830, from Column 4).
This rough equivalence suggests that a state's output will fall if
external patenting increases and the state's internal patenting fails to
keep pace. The rough equivalence, but opposite signs, of internal and
external patenting also reinforces the dependence hypothesis. Where
firms within a state license external patents, rather than invent
around them, a state risks falling further behind in its economic
output.
1. Fixed Effects Model
Again, however, statistical problems exist with this regression of
the annual data. The first is that even adding in variables for public
and private capital, other state-specific variations likely remain, such
as differences in a state's natural resources or proximity to
international markets, that may affect a state's economic output. If
these omitted variables are material and correlate with one of our
included regressors, this omission creates a risk of omitted variable
bias. Rather than attempt to add additional variables for each factor
that might influence a state's economic output, I estimated a fixed
92. A separate regression was performed that included a constant-returns-to-scale
restriction. For the restriction, F[1, 811]=180.25, with a p value of < 0.0001.
93. Separate regressions were performed that included a constant-returns-to-scale
restriction. For the restriction with external U.S. patenting, FI1, 810]=10.31, with p=0.0 14.
For the restriction with both external U.S. and external regional patenting, F1,
809]=12.57, with p=0.0004.
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effects model. A fixed effects model adds a constant for each year, or
for each year and each state, to the regression in an attempt to
account for year-specific or state-specific variables that are otherwise
omitted. Thus, if, for example, Texas has greater natural resources,
such as oil or natural gas than Delaware, and that difference plays
some role in explaining the two states' respective economic growth,
then adding a dummy variable that takes the value of one for Texas
and zero for Delaware can account for that difference in two states'
starting conditions. Similarly, if an external shock, such as the 1973
Arab oil embargo, caused economic output for all of the states to vary
in 1973, as compared to the other years, then adding a dummy
variable which takes the value of one for the year 1973, and zero for
all other years, can help isolate that effect and thereby improve our
ability to identify accurately the relationship between a state's
economic output on the one hand and a state's capital, labor, and
patenting on the other.
After running these fixed effect regressions, I tested whether the
fixed effects model improved our ability to isolate the relationships
between output, capital, labor, and patenting, using an F test. An F
test compares the overall fit of the basic model with the overall fit of
the fixed effect models. In this case, the F statistics for testing the
joint significance of year-specific effects (which compares the overall
fit of the basic model with the overall fit of a fixed effect model that
includes a dummy variable for each year), and for state- and year-
specific effects (which compares the overall fit of the basic model with
the overall fit of a fixed effect model that includes dummy variables
for each state and each year), are F{15, 795]=6.679 and F46,
749]=63.035, respectively. The F statistics are above the value for
statistical significance at the one percent level.94 This means that
there are omitted state-specific and year-specific variables that are
material. I should therefore rely on the coefficients from the full
fixed effects model to establish the correlation between state-level
patenting and output. Table 4 summarizes the results from the fixed
effects models.95
94. For F115,795] and F146,7491, the one percent critical values are 2.14 and 1.68,
respectively. With 1970 as the omitted year, the year-effect coefficients for 1973 and 1986
were statistically significant at the ten percent level: the 1973 coefficient was 0.03344
(p=0.0410), and the 1986 coefficient was 0.2206 (p=0.093 1). With Alabama as the omitted
state, thirty-six of the state-effect coefficients were statistically significant at the ten
percent level.
95. In Table 4, Q, is the state's real economic output, measured as gross state product,
in each year from 1970 through 1986; K,., is the state's private capital stock with a one-year
lag; L, is the state's labor supply, measured as total employment on nonagricultural
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Table 4: State Output: Fixed Effects Model
Dependent Variable: Log of Real Annual State Output, 1970-1986
Regressor Year Effects Both State and Year Effects
11.730 -1.8082Intercept (< 0.0001) (0.767)
0.356 0.196In K,, (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001)
0.501 0.777In L (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001)
0.0939 -0.1031In G,, (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001)
In0.0720 0.0625In ,_,(< 0.0001) (< 0.0001)
In7 ,-0.8952 0.518(< 0.0001) ( 351)
InT-0.01971 -0.0333In ,, ,.,(< 0.0001) (0.0674)
Adj. RW 0.9949 0.9989
No. Obs. 816 816
With year-specific effects, the results remain essentially
unchanged across the board. However, when the model incorporates
dummies for both state-specific and year-specific effects, a number of
the coefficients change significantly. In the full fixed effects model,
internal patenting remains significantly positive at the one percent
level, and external regional patenting remains significantly negative,
at least at the ten percent level. External U.S. patenting switches,
however, from significantly negative in the year-effects regression to
not statistically different from zero in the full fixed effect model. This
switch likely reflects omitted variable bias in the basic regression.
When I add the dummy variables for year- and state-specific effect
and remove that bias, I find that external U.S. patenting is not
negatively associated with a state's economic growth.
In determining whether to accord much weight to full fixed
effects model and the nominal sign change on the coefficient for
payrolls from the Bureau of Labor; G,-, is the state's public capital stock with a one-year
lag; T,-, is the state's internal patenting with a one-year lag; T-,,, is the number of patents
issued to residents of the United States, other than the state at issue, with a one-year lag;
T,,g.,i is the number of patents issued to residents of a state's geographic region, other than
the state at issue, with a one-year lag; and p values are in parentheses.
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external U.S. patenting, two additional points deserve emphasis.
First, the coefficients on private capital and labor in the full fixed
effects model differ substantially from the historical 35-65 division of
national income (0.196, with p < 0.0001, for capital, and 0.777, with
p < 0.0001, for labor). Second, the coefficient on public capital
becomes negative and statistically significant in the full fixed effects
model (-0.1031, p < 0.0001). These results are inconsistent with my
theoretical expectations and raise some questions regarding the
reliability of my results.
2. Patenting Versus R&D Expenditures
In order to distinguish patenting from research efforts, I
performed an additional set of regressions, adding state-level research
and development ("R&D") expenditures as reported by the National
Science Foundation ("NSF"). In the literature, R&D spending is
usually taken as a measure of the economic resources devoted to
creating new products and services, while patenting is usually taken as
a measure of the success of such activities.96 Including R&D
expenditures in my analysis may therefore cast some light on the
respective roles that research efforts and research success play in
increasing economic output. Because the NSF R&D data set is not
complete,97 the regressions follow the approach of Hall and Ziedonis
and include a dummy variable, NTREP, equal to one when the state's
R&D expenditures are not reported in a particular year.98
For this analysis, equation (6) becomes:
ln(Q,)=a+blnK,-, +clnL, +dlnG,_, +elnT +fNTREP+glnRDEXP+,- (6a)
where: NTREP is a dummy variable set to one where data for the
state's R&D expenditures are not reported for that year, and to zero
otherwise; and RDEXP is the state's reported R&D expenditures
with a one-year lag.
Four regressions were performed. The first included the state-
level R&D variables but omitted all patenting terms (as is reported in
96. See, e.g., lain Cockburn & Zvi Griliches, Industry Effects and Appropriability
Measures in the Stock Market's Valuation of R&D and Patents, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 419,
422 (1988) ("Data on R&D expenditures, where available, are stronger measures of input
to the process by which firms produce technical innovation than patents are of its
'output.' 
").
97. Of the 816 possible observations of a state's annual R&D expenditures, 371
observations (or 45.5%) were missing.
98. Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: An
Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995, 32 RAND J.
ECON. 101,116 (2001).
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Column 1); the second added internal patenting (and is reported in
Column 2); the third added external U.S. patenting (and is reported
in Column 3); and the fourth added external regional patenting to the
regression (and is reported in Column 4). Table 5 summarizes the
results.99
Table 5: State Output as a Function of Public and Private Capital,
Labor, and Patenting
Dependent Variable: Log of Real Annual State Output, 1970-1986
Regressor (1) (2) (3) (4)
1.677 1.733 2.745 2.785Intercept (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001)
0.315 0.368 0.368 0.357In K,, (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001)
0.578 0.504 0.486 0.496in L, (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001)
0.147 0.0963 0.101 0.103In G,, (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001)
0.0270 0.0230 0.007 0.0059(0.001) (0.0019) (0.376) (0.450)
0.010 0.0041 0.00253 0.00152(< 0.0001) (0.0118) (0.1231) (0.348)
0.0707 0.0793 0.0825(< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001)
In T -0.0914 -0.0782(< 0.0001) (< 0.0001)
-0.0208in Tr,g.,...
(< 0.0001)
Adj. R2  0.9926 0.9940 0.9942 0.9944
No. Obs. 816 816 816 816
99. In Table 5, the dependent variable, Q,, is the state's real economic output,
measured as gross state product, in each year from 1970 through 1986; K is the state's
private capital stock with a one-year lag; L, is the state's labor supply, measured as total
employment on nonagricultural payrolls from the Bureau of Labor; G,- is the state's
public capital stock with a one-year lag; T,-, is the state's internal patenting with a one-year
lag; T ,, is the number of patents issued to residents of the United States, other than the
state at issue, with a one-year lag; T,,, is the number of patents issued to residents of a
state's geographic region, other than the state at issue, with a one-year lag; NTREP is a
dummy variable set to one where data for the state's R&D expenditures are not reported
for that year, and to zero otherwise; RDEXP are the state's reported R&D expenditures
with a one-year lag; and p values are in parentheses.
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As Table 5 reflects, the sign of the state-level R&D expenditure
coefficients are positive, as expected. However, as additional
patenting variables are added to the regression, the state-level R&D
expenditures coefficient becomes statistically insignificant and also
falls from 0.010 in Column 1 to 0.00152 in the full regression (Column
4). This is likely due to some degree of multicollinearity between
R&D expenditures and patenting activity. The correlation between
the natural logs of internal patenting and state-level R&D
expenditures for the data set was 0.70 (p < 0.0001). However, using
the auxiliary regression technique, the natural log of reported R&D
expenses was regressed against the remaining right-hand side
variables in equation (6a), and the adjusted R2 was 0.689. This is less
than the adjusted R2for the basic model; I should not therefore expect
multicollinearity to prevent precise parameter estimates.
Interestingly, this macroeconomic relationship is precisely the
opposite of what Cockburn and Griliches find in their analysis of the
contribution of a firm's inventiveness to its market value."' In their
analysis, the patent variables become insignificant when R&D
variables are added to their regression, leading them to conclude that
R&D expenditures are better measures of input to the innovative
function of firms than patents are of their output. For economic
growth at the macroeconomic rather than firm level, Table 5 suggests
that patenting activity is a better measure of innovation's contribution
to growth than R&D expenditures. Along the same lines, for each of
the regression results that incorporate internal patenting, the
elasticity with respect to internal patenting is significantly higher than
the elasticity with respect to R&D expenditures.
3. Model Specification: Levels or Differences
So far I have performed all of my regressions with this annual
data using the level of capital, labor, or patenting in a given year as
my regressors. The use of levels in these regressions necessarily
assumes that the error terms are serially independent and that the
variables are stationary. In response to Alicia Munnell's analysis
showing a positive correlation between public capital and state
economic output,'01 along with a similar analysis reaching similar
results by Aschauer,1 °2 a number of economists pointed out the risk of
100. See Cockburn & Griliches, supra note 96, at 420-21.
101. See Munnell & Cook, supra note 21, at 93-95.
102. See David Alan Aschauer, Is Public Expenditure Productive?, 23 J. MONETARY
ECON. 177,177-200 (1989).
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performing these macroeconomic regressions in levels and suggested
that the regressions should be performed using first differences1 3
rather than levels to avoid the risk of spurious correlation.1" To test
my data for these issues, I can use a test that Bhargava, Franzini, and
Narendranathan provided.0 5 Calculating their test statistic for the
residuals from the full fixed effects model presented in Table 4 yields
a modified Durbin-Watson test statistic, d,=0.4314. The null
hypothesis of serial independence in the error term is therefore
rejected at the five percent level of significance. Rejecting the null
hypothesis suggests in turn that the error terms of my regressors may
be serially correlated and that running the regression in levels creates
a risk of spurious correlation-that the model will identify a
statistically significant correlation between one of my regressors, such
as internal patenting, and a state's economic output when such a
correlation does not in fact exist. To avoid the risk of spurious
correlations, I should use a regression in differences rather than
levels.
To estimate equation (6) in differences, I start with equation (6)
itself, for the year t:
ln(Q,)=a+blnK_1 +clnL, +dlnG,  + elnT,_ +flnT,, +glnTreg,,1 +e, (6)
I can also write equation (6) for the previous year, t-1:
ln(Q 1,) =a+blnK, +clnL,_, +dnG,-2 +elnT-_ +flnT,,_2 +glnTeg_, +e, (6')
To perform the regression in differences, I simply subtract
equation (6') from equation (6). Grouping similar terms, I can
rewrite the difference between equation (6') and equation (6) as:
Aln(Q,)=a+bAlnK,_, +cAlnL +dAlnG,_ +eAlnT,_, +fAinTs,,_, + gAlnT,,,,,_, +6 (6b)
where:
Jln(Q,)=ln(Q,)-ln(Q,.,) and Qis the state's real economic
103. A regression in levels looks for a correlation between the level of patenting in a
given year and the state's level of economic output in the following year. A regression in
differences looks at how the change in patenting from one year to the next affects the
change in state economic output from one year to the next. For an explanation of
nonstationary time series econometric modeling, see generally GEORGE E.P. BOX ET AL.,
TIME SERIES ANALYSIS: FORECASTING AND CONTROL 93-136 (4th ed. 2008).
104. See Teresa Garcia-Mil et al., The Effect of Public Capital in State-Level
Production Functions Reconsidered, 78 REV. ECON. & STAT. 177 (1996); Douglas Holtz-
Eakin, Public-Sector Capital and the Productivity Puzzle, 76 REV. ECON. & STAT. 12
(1994).
105. A. Bhargrava, L. Franzini & W. Narendranathan, Serial Correlation and the Fixed
Effects Model, 49 REV. ECON. STUD. 533, 534-36 (1982).
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output, measured as gross state product, in each year from 1970
through 1986;
Aln(K,.,)=ln(K,.,)-ln(K, 2) and K,, is the state's private capital
stock with a one-year lag;
Aln(L,)=ln(L,)-ln(L,.,) and L, is the state's labor supply,
measured as total employment on nonagricultural payrolls from
the Bureau of Labor;
Jlfn(G,.,)=ln(G,)-ln(G,2) and G,, is the state's public capital
stock with a one-year lag;
AJln(T,,)=ln(T,,)-n(T 2) and T,, is the state's internal patenting
with a one-year lag;
Aln(T,.,)=ln(T,,.,)-ln(T,. 2) and Tu.,,- is the number of patents
issued to residents of the United States, other than the state at
issue, with a one-year lag; and
Aln(Treg,t-1)=ln(Treg,t-1)-ln(Treg,t-2) and Treg,t-1 is the
number of patents issued to residents of a state's geographic
region, other than the state at issue, with a one-year lag.
When I first difference the equation, the dummy variables for
each state and year found in our fixed effects model run in levels fall
out. Despite that mathematical result, dropping the dummy variables
would nevertheless be inappropriate. I use the dummy variable or
fixed effects model to minimize the risk of omitted variable bias.
Specifically, if state-specific or year-specific considerations (other
than labor, capital, and patenting) that play a role in a state's
economic performance are omitted, yet correlate with patenting, then
our coefficients will be biased. Ideally, to account for all of the
potential omitted variables-both those that are constant, such as the
natural resources or geographic proximity of the state to export
markets, and those that may vary from year-to-year, such as the
amount of natural resources produced or the volume of
imports/exports passing through-I should include dummy variables
for each state for each year. If I did so, however, I would have more
coefficients to solve for than observations, and I could not solve my
model. For that reason, as is typical for macroeconomic studies, the
fixed effects model included only one dummy for each state and one
for each year, rather than one for each state, each year.
While it is true that first differencing the equation eliminates, as
a mathematical matter, the dummy variables I was able to include,
first differencing does not eliminate the risk of omitted variable bias
that the dummy variables were intended to address. While in a first
differenced equation, state-specific factors that remain constant from
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year-to-year fall out, there may nonetheless remain state-specific
considerations that both vary year-to-year and affect the state's
economic performance. If these considerations are omitted and
correlate with one of my regressors, they create the same type of risk
of omitted variable bias in my first differenced regression that
justified the use of dummies for each state and each year in my base
regression. As a result, equation (6b) was estimated: (i) without
effects, (ii) with year-specific effects, and (iii) with both year- and
state-specific effects. The F statistic for testing the joint significance
for state- and year-specific effects for the difference regression is
F[61, 699]=6.64-again above the value for statistical significance at
the one percent level.116 This suggests that, even in differences, the
fixed effects model should be used. Table 6 presents the results for
both the without effects model and the full fixed effects model.
106. For F[61, 699], the one percent critical value is 1.59. With 1971 as the omitted
year, the year-effect coefficients for 1974, 1977, and 1978 were statistically significant at
the ten percent level: the 1974 coefficient was -0.06765 (p=0.0265), the 1977 coefficient
was -0.01819 (p=0.0175), and the 1978 coefficient was -0.01485 (p=0.0008). With Alabama
as the omitted state, eight state-effect coefficients were statistically significant at the ten
percent level.
107. In Table 6, zln(Q,)=ln(Q,)-In(Q,,) and Q, is the state's real economic output,
measured as gross state product, in each year from 1970 through 1986; Aln(K,-,)=ln(K,.,)-
ln(K,2) and K,., is the state's private capital stock with a one-year lag ,Jln(L,)=ln(L,)-
ln(L,.,) and L, is the state's labor supply, measured as total employment on nonagricultural
payrolls from the Bureau of Labor; Jfn(G,.,)=ln(G,_,)-in(G,2) and G,-, is the state's public
capital stock with a one-year lag; ,lln(T,,_)=ln(T,,)-n(T,) and T,-, is the state's internal
patenting with a one-year lag; Ain(T.,_,)=ln(T,.,)-ln(T, .,2) and T_,,, is the number of
patents issued to residents of the United States, other than the state at issue, with a one-
year lag; Aln(T,,,.,.,)=ln(To .,.)-ln(T,,o.,) and T,.,-, is the number of patents issued to
residents of a state's geographic region, other than the state at issue, with a one-year lag;
and p values are in parentheses.
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Table 6: State Output as a Function of Labor, Private and Public
Capital, and Patenting-First Differences
Dependent Variable: First Difference Log of Real Annual State
Output, 1971-1986
NE Both State andRegressor No.e ~Year Effects
0.00777 0.0399Intercept <0.0001) (0.192)
-0.0588 -0.0107Aln K,, (0.0130) (0.604)
1.0377 1.028AlnL, (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001)
-0.1120 0.00852An G,., (0.0153) (0.885)
0.00298 0.0114Aln T,, (0.6165) (0.0344)
0.00068 0.1861Aln T., 1  (0.9757) (0.666)
0.01416 0.1034
Aln Tr,,-, (0.4736) (< 0.0001)
Adj. R2  0.6683 0.7830
No. Obs. 768 768
Running the regression in differences changes the results with
respect to external regional patenting significantly. Instead of being
negative and statistically significant, as it was in the levels model, the
external regional patenting coefficient in the first difference fixed
effects model is positive and statistically significant. The internal
patenting coefficient remains positive and statistically significant,
while the external U.S. patenting coefficient remains statistically
indistinguishable from zero. This means that a state's own patenting
in a given year, as well as patenting activity by the residents of states
in the same economic region, are both associated with increased
economic output for the state in the following year. In contrast,
patenting activity in a given year by the residents of states outside of a
state's own economic region is not associated with either an increase
or a decrease in that state's economic output in the following year.
That the external regional patenting coefficient is positive and
statistically significant provides some support for the free trade view
of TRIPs. In a regime of uniform high patent protection, patenting
by one state is associated with increased economic output by its
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neighboring states. However, as Munnell has noted in response to
her critics, 10 8 switching to differences also generates coefficients for
private capital and labor that are inconsistent with the theoretical
predictions. This inconsistency raises questions regarding the
reliability of my regression results.
Moreover, the use of annual data implicitly assumes that the full
effects of capital investments and technological innovation are felt in,
and restricted to, the next year's economic output. If I assume that a
state's capital investment or its patenting decreases sharply in a given
year, whether and how that change affects economic performance is
likely to depend on whether the decrease is part of a continuing trend
of such decreases or a blip in otherwise uniform increases in capital or
patenting. Because both capital investments and technological
innovation are likely to influence state economic performance over
more than an annual period, an annual model may not accurately or
fully capture the role of patenting and capital investments in
economic growth.
C. A Third Look with Ten-Year Averages: Patenting and Human
Capital
To explore a longer timeframe for capital and technological
effects, and to examine more carefully the relationship between
patenting and human capital, I performed a third set of regressions. I
have data for human capital and patenting since 1950,09 and I used
this data in my initial regression to estimate the relationships between
growth rates, human capital growth, and internal and external
patenting per capita over the last half of the twentieth century. Yet, I
did not use all of the data available. Given that I have data points for
human capital every ten years-i.e. 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990-
I can average a state's real per capita income, as well as internal and
external per capita patenting, for ten-year periods centered on the
dates of the human capital data points. Although I do not have
private and public capital accumulations for this period, I can use a
log of per capita income as a proxy for these terms and estimate:
ln(y,) = a+bln(,y_,) +clnH-, + dln(t,-) + eln(t.8,,-,) + fln(treg,,-l) + e (7)
108. Alicia H. Munnell, Policy Watch: Infrastructure Investment and Economic
Growth, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1992, at 189, 192-93.
109. For a description of the available data, see supra text accompanying notes 61-70.
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where.-
Y, is the state's average per capita real income over three ten-
year periods from 1966-1975, 1976-1985, 1986-1995, 1996-2005;
y, is the proxy for per capita capital and represents the state's
average per capita real income over each ten-year period, lagged
by one ten-year period, and thus beginning with 1956-1965;
H_, is the state's human capital at the mid-point of the ten-year
periods, lagged by one ten-year period;
ti- is the state's average annual per capita internal patenting,
defined as patents issued to residents of the state at issue, over
each ten-year period, lagged by one ten-year period;
is the average annual per capita external patenting,
defined as patents issued to residents of the United States other
than residents of the relevant state, over each ten-year period,
lagged by one ten-year period; and
tregt-i is the average annual per capita external regional
patenting, defined as patents issued to residents of the state's
economic region other than state's own residents, over each ten-
year period, lagged by one ten-year period.
I cannot estimate equation (7) directly with ordinary least
squares, however. Because a lagged value of the dependent variable
is included on the right-hand side, the error term, e is correlated with
a dependent variable. Given this correlation, ordinary least squares
estimation is inconsistent. Following Anderson and Hsiaoj 0 I
therefore first difference"'. equation (7) as follows:
[ln(y,) - ln(y,_1)] = a + b[ln(y,_,) - ln(y,_,)] + c(ln H,-, - In H,-, ) + d[ln(t,-,) - In(t,-2)
+ e[ lnQt 5,1 -i ) - ln(t..,,-2)] + f[lnl~teg,t- i) - lnl(teg,,-2) + (6"i, -6,,_ ~)
I cannot estimate this equation directly either, however, because
[ln(y,_,)-ln(y,_2)] is correlated with the errors (e,- ,,_). I therefore
instrument for [ln(y,_,)-ln(y,_2)] using ln(y,_2) and estimate:
Aln@y,)=a+bln y,_2 )+cA(lnl-,_+dAln(t,-,)+eAln~t , _l)+ fAln(tregj-,)+e (7a)
110. T.W. Anderson & Cheng Hsiao, Estimation of Dynamic Models with Error
Components, 76 J. AM. STAT. ASSOC. 598,598-606 (1981).
111. We do not need to first difference the data in order to render it stationary. The
Bhargrava, Franzini, and Narendranathan study (1982) modified Durbin-Watson test
statistic is 1.663, rejecting the random walk null hypothesis. See Bhargrava et al., supra
note 105, at 544.
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As previously discussed, as a mathematical proposition, first
differencing eliminates the dummy variables for state- and decade-
specific fixed effects. Nonetheless, as with the annual data, the risk of
omitted variable bias, which the fixed effects model attempts to
address, persists. As a result, I regress equation (7a): (i) without
fixed effects; (ii) with decade-specific effects; and (iii) with state- and
decade-specific effects. Because the coefficients on the dummy
variables for two of the decades and eight of the states were
statistically significant at the five percent level, I should rely on the
full fixed effects model. Results for the model without fixed effects
and for the full fixed effects model for equation (7a) are presented in
Table 7.112
112. In Table 7, the dependent variable, A[ln(y,)-ln(y,_)], is the difference in the
natural logs of the state's average real per capita real income over four ten-year periods
from 1966-1975, 1976-1985, 1986-1995, and 1996-2005, and the natural log of the state's
average real per capita real income over the preceding ten-year period; In(y,-2) is the
natural log of the state's average per capita income over the ten-year period, lagged by
two ten-year periods, and thus beginning with 1946-1955, and is the instrument for
A[ln( y,_ ) - In(y,-2)] ; AInH,_, is the difference between the natural logs of state's human
capital at the mid-point of the ten-year periods, lagged by one ten-year period; Alnt,-. is
the difference in the natural logs of the state's average annual per capita internal
patenting, defined as patents issued to residents of the state at issue, over each ten-year
period, lagged by one ten-year period; Alnt., - is the difference in the natural logs of the
average annual per capita external patenting, defined as patents issued to residents of the
United States other than residents of the relevant state, over each ten-year period, lagged
by one ten-year period; A In t g,-, is the difference in the natural logs of the number of per
capita patents issued to residents of a state's geographic region, other than the state at
issue, lagged by one ten-year period; and p values are in parentheses.
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Table 7: Regression Results
Ten- Year Averages, 48 States, 1966-2005
Dependent Variable: Ten-Year Averages of Real Per Capita Income
Regressor Without Fixed Effects With Full Effects
2.2738 0.9481Intercept (< 0.0001) (0.1725)
-0.21259 -0.08841In Y1-2 (< 0.0001) (0.1947)
-0.11485 -0.02758Ain Ht_1  (0.0119) (0.5949)
0.07846 0.04712
Aln tt-i (< 0.0001) (0.0195)
0.1455 0.40654
Aln tus,I- (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001)
-0.1137 0.025653An treg,t-1 (< 0.0001) (0.5255)
Adj. R 2  0.6324 0.8523
No. Obs. 192 192
In the full fixed effects regression, only the coefficients on
internal and external U.S. patenting are statistically significant. Both
coefficients are output elasticities, indicating that a one percent
increase in internal patenting or external U.S. patenting is associated
with a 0.04%, or a 0.41%, respectively, increase in state real per
capita income, all else constant.
In contrast, the coefficients on the human capital and the
external regional patenting variables become statistically
indistinguishable from zero. That these coefficients are not
significant is surprising. First, given the endogenous growth
theoretical models of Lucas and Romer,"3 and the cross-country
empirical work of Mankiw, Romer, and Weil,114 I should expect a
positive correlation between human capital and per capita income.
Second, and similarly, given the usual conclusion that innovation
spillovers are geographically localized based upon patent citation
data,115 as well as my results for the annual data regressions," 6 I would
113. See Lucas, supra note 30; Romer, supra note 30.
114. See Mankiw et al., supra note 18.
115. See Jaffe et al., supra note 84, at 595 ("Despite the invisibility of knowledge
spillovers, they do leave a paper trail in the form of citations. We find evidence that these
trails, at least, are geographically localized. The results, particularly for the 1980 cohort,
suggest that these effects are quite large and quite significant statistically."); Peri, supra
1508 [Vol. 87
PATENTS AND GROWTH
expect the regional external patenting coefficient to be positive and at
least as significant as the external patenting coefficient for the United
States as a whole. Yet, neither coefficient is statistically significant for
the ten-year averaged data.
The lack of a positive correlation between growth in human
capital and economic output raises questions regarding the reliability
of my results. In contrast, the switch in the external regional
patenting coefficient from statistically significant and positive in the
annual data to not statistically different from zero in the ten-year
averaged data may reflect the time required for knowledge
diffusion.117 On an annual basis, only patenting by neighboring states
is associated with a state's economic output. In contrast, over a ten-
year period, patenting not just by the residents of neighboring states,
but by residents of other states, generally is associated with a state's
economic output.
IV. EXAMINING WHETHER THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
PATENTING AND GROWTH VARIES FOR HIGH AND Low PATENTING
STATES
So far my results consistently suggest that internal patenting is
positively correlated with a state's per capita income, output, and
economic growth. Although more mixed, my results also suggest that
external patenting-regional external patenting for the annual data
and U.S. external patenting for the ten-year data-is also positively
correlated with a state's per capita income, output, and economic
growth. Yet, these results are based upon regressions that pool data
for the forty-eight states, and are thus "on average" results. They
implicitly assume that the relationship between internal and external
patenting and economic output or growth is the same for both high
and low patenting states. To check whether high and low patenting
states respond similarly to internal and external patenting, I repeated
note 85, at 320 (using patent citation data and finding that knowledge can remain
geographically localized).
116. As reflected in Table 6, the external regional patenting coefficient for the annual
data was positive and statistically significant. See supra text pp. 1504-05.
117. This corresponds with findings, made in studies tracing patent citations, that
geographic localization of knowledge weakens over time. See Jaffe et al., supra note 84, at
596 ("We also find evidence that geographic localization fades over time. The 1980
citations, which have shorter average citation lags, are systematically more localized than
the 1975 citations."). But see Peri, supra note 85, at 314 ("Estimates across the
specifications (I through VI) in Table 2 are remarkably stable. Whether 2, 6, or 10 years
elapse, the degree of relative geographic localization of knowledge remains rather
stable.").
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each of the three growth regressions, separating the data for high and
low patenting states. To undertake this reexamination, I divided the
forty-eight states into quartiles according to their average annual
patenting per capita over the relevant time period. Beginning with
the initial 1951-2000 regression set forth in equation (5), I re-
estimated each of the regressions for the quartiles separately.
Table 8 reports the results for the regressions using the fifty-year
averaged data.118
Table 8: Growth Regression
Internal and External Patenting Coefficients by Patenting Quartile
Dependent Variable:
Income, 1951-2000
Average Annual Growth in Real Per Capita
Patenting Quartile
Regressor 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
0.08119 0.1683 0.06538 0.1531Intercept (0.5096) (0.0077) (0.09186) (0.0036)
-0.00815 -0.01653 -0.00751 -0.01530In y, (0.5112) (0.01190) (0.06263) (0.0006)
* 0.4534 0.061.89 0.7038 0.1422
kh (0.2055) (0.7200) (0.0064) (0.2763)
- 8.061.0 34.9696 17.4 2.8106
t (0.2706) (0.415) (0.337) (0.487)
- -0.02690 -0.10338 0.02782 0.03615
tus (0.2403) (0.0578) (0.197) (0.1001)
Adj. R2  0.325 0.779 0.687 0.901
No. Obs. 12 12 12 12
As Table 8 reflects, relatively few of the coefficients are
statistically significant (possibly because of the limited number of
observations for each data set). Yet, the signs for the convergence
criteria, human capital, and internal patenting are, as expected,
positive for each of the four quartiles. Although none of the internal
patenting coefficients are statistically significant individually, the
118. For Table 8, the convergence criteria, In y, is the natural log of per capita income
in 1950; k h is the state's average annual growth rate in human capital from 1950 through
2000; 1 is the average annual number of per capita patents issued to a lead inventor
resident in the state from 1951 through 2000; t- is defined as the average number of
patents issued annually to residents of the United States, other than the state at issue; and
p values are listed in parentheses.
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likelihood that all four would be positive through random chance
alone is only one in sixteen or p=0.06125. Only one of the four
external patenting coefficients is statistically significant, and it is
negative: -0.10338 (2nd Patenting Quartile, p=0.0578). However, in
contrast to the consistently positive sign on the internal patenting
coefficients, the signs on the external patenting coefficients switch
from negative for the first and second quartiles to positive for the
third and fourth quartiles. Thus, the fifty-year average data suggests
that external patenting may have a different relationship with
economic growth depending on a state's own level of inventiveness.
Before analyzing these results, the first task is to test their
robustness. I therefore re-estimated equation (6b), for the annual
data from 1970-1986, and equation (7a), for the ten-year averaged
data covering 1966-2005, for the four patenting quartiles. I regressed
the annual data in differences to avoid the risk of spurious
correlation, and for both the annual and ten-year averaged data, I
included both year- (or decade-) and state-specific fixed effects.119
Table 9 reports the results for the annual data set,12° and Table 10
reports the results for the ten-year average data set. 21
119. Statistical tests indicate that both effects were statistically significant for all four
quartiles for both regressions.
120. For Table 9, Aln(Q,)=ln(Q)-ln(Q,,) and Q, is the state's real economic output,
measured as gross state product, in each year from 1970 through 1986; Aln(K,_,)=ln(K,.)-
ln(K,.2) and K,-, is the state's private capital stock with a one-year lag; 41n(L,)=ln(L)-
ln(L,.,) and L, is the state's labor supply, measured as total employment on nonagricultural
payrolls from the Bureau of Labor; Aln(G,_,)=In(G,)-n(G,_2) and G,, is the state's public
capital stock with a one-year lag; zln(T,,)=In(T,_,)-In(T,2) and T,, is the state's internal
patenting with a one-year lag; zln(T,,,,)=ln(T,.,,)-ln(T,,.,.) and T,,,, 2 is the number of
patents issued to residents of the United States, other than the state at issue, with a one-
year lag; AIn(Tg,)=ln(T,,g,,)-l(T,gv.) and T,,,, is the number of patents issued to
residents of a state's geographic region, other than the state at issue, with a one-year lag;
and p values are in parentheses.
121. For Table 10, the dependent variable, A[ln(y,)-ln(y,_,)], is the difference
between the state's average per capita real income over four ten-year periods from 1966-
1975, 1976-1985, 1986-1995, and 1996-2005, and the average per capita real income over
the preceding ten-year period; ln(y,_2) is the natural log of the state's average per capita
income over the ten-year period, lagged by two ten-year periods, and thus beginning with
1946-1955, and is the instrument for A[ln(y,_,)-ln(y,-2)]; AInH,_ is the difference
between the natural logs of state's human capital at the mid-point of the ten-year periods,
lagged by one ten-year period; Alnt,_ is the difference in the natural logs of the state's
average annual per capita internal patenting, defined as patents issued to residents of the
state at issue, over each ten-year period, lagged by one ten-year period; AInt.,,, is the
difference in the natural logs of the average annual per capita external patenting, defined
as patents issued to residents of the United States other than residents of the relevant
state, over each ten-year period, lagged by one ten-year period A lntr ,-, is the difference
in the natural logs of the number of per capita patents issued to residents of a state's
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Table 9: Analysis of Annual Gross State Product Data By Patenting
Quartile, First Differences, With Year and State Effects
Dependent Variable:
Output, 1971-1986
First Difference Log of Real Annual State
Regressor Patenting Quartile
1st 2nd 3rd 4th
Intercept 0.0991 0.05059 0.1372 -0.0508Itret ( 034) (0.5146) (0.2783) (0.8979)
-0.02437 -0.01546 -0.04878 0.0834
Al K, (0.4603) (0.5919) (0.2589) (0.1780)
1.2332 1.0597 0.9094 0.9771
Al L (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001)
0.1458 -0.1584 -0.1330 0.0167
An G,., (0.2031) (0.0238) (0.2918) (0.8644)
0.0832 0.03005 0.0127 0.00544
Al T,, (0.0001) (0.0075) (0.3344) (0.6883)
Am T 1.0707 0.45903 1.5290 -1.1637
"1n T, (0.0170) (0.6817) (0.4007) (0.8395)
Ai T,,,,, 0.0428 0.01091 0.1140 0.2371
Aln T _ .... (0.088) (0.6229) (0.0050) (< 0.0001)
No. Obs. 192 192 192 192
geographic region, other than the state at issue, lagged by one ten-year period; and p
values are in parentheses.
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Table 10: Analysis of Ten-Year Average Data By Patenting Quartile,
With State- and Decade-Specific Effects
Dependent Variable: Ten-Year Averages of Real Per Capita Income,
1965-1995
___________Patenting QuartileRegressor 1st 7 2nd 3rd 4th
Intercept -0.1856 -1.3156 0.9480 0.69448(0.9238) (0.5759) (0.5037) (0.6854)
- 0.0232 0.1391 -0.08868 -0.06553In Y,-2 (0.9041) (0.5514) (0.5373) (0.6957)
0.0330 0.0403 -0.1459 0.1498Ain H,-, (0.6973) (0.799) (0.2669) (0.1871)
0.0390 0.06677 0.02881 0.03799
Alnt,-1  (0.3125) (0.1130) (0.5692) (0.5234)
0.0390 0.06677 0.02881 0.03799
A In t,- (0.0623) (0.1862) (0.5449) (0.0064)
~ -0.0577 -0.00528 0.1,059 0.02646
Aln treg,t-1 (0.3812) (0.9435) (0.3083) (0.8444)
No. Obs. 48 48 48 48
As Tables 9 and 10 reflect, both the annual and ten-year data
support the notion that, within a regime of uniformly high IPRs,
external patenting is positively correlated with a state's economic
performance for both high- and low-patenting states. With the
annual 1970-1986 data, regressed in differences, the coefficient on the
external regional patenting variable is positive for the first, third, and
fourth patenting quartiles and becomes larger in magnitude for the
third and fourth quartile (0.1140 and 0.2371, respectively) and more
statistically significant (p=0.005, p < 0.0001, respectively) than for the
first quartile (0.0428, p=0.088). Similarly, in the ten-year data
regressions, the coefficient on the external U.S. patenting quartile is
positive and statistically significant for both the first and fourth
patenting quartile, and again both larger (0.7098 versus 0.4255) and
more statistically significant for the fourth quartile (p < 0.0064 versus
p=0.0623).
Although not perfectly robust, the results provide some support
for the proposition that, within a regime of uniformly high IPRs,
external patenting is more strongly correlated with a state's economic
performance for states in the fourth patenting quartiles, or, in other
words, for those states without a domestic patenting sector. These
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results also tentatively suggest that the potential loser in such a
regime is not the low patenting states in the third and fourth quartile,
but the intermediate patenting states in the second quartile. Of all
the quartiles, the second patenting quartile is the only one with a
negative and statistically significant coefficient on any external
patenting variable (in the fifty-year averaged regression in Table 8)
and also the only one that is not otherwise positive and statistically
significant in either the annual or ten-year averaged data regressions.
As between the two explanations for a negative coefficient on
external patenting, these results tend to support the foreclosure
hypothesis over the dependence or negative externality hypothesis.
Recall that under the foreclosure hypothesis,122 external patenting
slows a state's growth, either in the strong form, by foreclosing certain
fields from domestic innovation, or in the weak form, by preventing a
domestic firm from winning a given patent race and collecting the
associated rents. If either foreclosure hypothesis is accurate, I should
expect external patenting to have a stronger negative correlation for
states with more internal patenting. These are the states with the
most active innovation communities, and hence, the most to lose from
foreclosure. In contrast, with dependence, I would expect external
patenting to have either a uniformly negative correlation or a more
negative correlation for states that have little internal patenting and
are consequently more dependent on external patents for
technological advances. Given that the coefficients on external
patenting are more negative for states with more active patenting
communities, the results tend to support the foreclosure rather than
the dependence hypothesis. Inventors in states in the second
patenting quartile may be engaging in, but consistently losing, patent
races.
CONCLUSION
When I first started this Article, I must confess that I was
somewhat skeptical of TRIPs as a mutually welfare-enhancing, free
trade measure. After all, if high IPRs were beneficial for net-PR
importing countries, it is difficult to explain why the United States
and other net-IPR exporters had to persuade their trading partners to
adopt higher IPRs through the GATT process. Nevertheless, the
results presented in this Article, while not perfectly robust, are more
consistent with the argument that TRIPs will prove mutually welfare-
enhancing than with the argument that TRIPs is a form of rent-
122. See supra text pp. 1489-90.
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seeking likely to benefit net IPR exporters alone. Under a free trade
view of TRIPs, I would expect to find consistently positive
coefficients on the external patenting variables. In contrast, if TRIPs
were simply rent-seeking, I would expect to find a consistently
negative relationship between external patenting and a state's
economic performance. While I have presented a variety of models
in this Article, the most reliable statistically are the first differenced,
full fixed effects models with the annual and ten-year data. For both,
the coefficients on external patenting are either: (i) positive and
statistically significant or (ii) not statistically significant different from
zero. Moreover, when I break the states down into patenting
quartiles, the positive correlation between external patenting and a
state's economic performance becomes more, not less, significant as a
state's own patenting activity declines.
These conclusions are necessarily tempered by the limitations of
the data available and the characteristics of my natural experiment.
Data on private and public capital by state is available for only
seventeen years. While patenting data is available for longer time
periods, the patenting data has other limitations. First, not all patents
are valuable, and not all patents are equally valuable, so "issued"
patents is a noisy measure of the sub-category of "valuable" patents.
Second, the Patent and Trademark Office assigns a patent to the state
in which the first-named inventor resides. This is somewhat arbitrary
given that a patent may have multiple inventors, some of whom may
reside in different states. In addition, most patents are assigned in
advance to a corporation, which may have shareholders in any
number of states, so that the benefits of a patent will not flow
exclusively to the state in which its first-named inventor resides.
Additional work addressing these issues may improve my ability to
identify the relationships between internal and external patenting and
economic growth.
Even putting these limitations of the data to one side, I also
cannot tell if the correlation between patenting and economic
performance reflects directly the rents and other economic benefits
derived from a patent's exclusion of others from making, using, or
selling the patented invention, or if patenting is simply serving as a
proxy for a state's otherwise unobserved inventiveness-
inventiveness that might be present with or without a patent regime.
The fact that patenting remains positively correlated with economic
performance even when human capital and R&D expenditures are
added separately to the regression provides some indication that
patenting is not merely a proxy for a state's inventiveness. In
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addition, the fact that the relationship between external patenting and
economic performance varies among states depending on their own
level of patenting activity is also more consistent with patents as
exclusionary rights than with patents as proxies for otherwise
unobserved innovation. If patents simply reflected technological
advance, it is hard to see why external patenting would have a more
positive correlation with economic performance for the states in the
third- and fourth-patenting quartiles than for states in the second.
Nevertheless, further work may help establish the respective
contributions these potential roles-exclusionary legal right or proxy
for technological advance-play in the correlation between patents
and economic performance.
Finally, because I am relying on a natural experimental
framework, these results do not address whether a regime of high,
low, or no IPRs is best. The regressions examine the correlations
between patenting and economic performance in the United States,
given the level of patent protection that was actually provided. My
regressions did not-and given the structure of the natural
experiment, could not-demonstrate how patenting, or the
underlying inventive activity patenting represents, would correlate
with economic performance in a regime with some other level of
patent protection, or none at all. 23 Moreover, although they may
fade with time, the differences in factor mobility of labor, capital, and
information, and in cultural and legal homogeneity between the U.S.
market and the international market generally caution against
extrapolating these results directly to the international markets that
TRIPs govern.
In that light, this Article does not answer all of the questions
regarding the desirability of TRIPs, nor is it intended to. It does
establish, however, that within the United States, under a regime of
uniformly high IPRs, both internal and external patenting correlate
positively with a state's economic performance, at least on average.
For the annual data, external regional patenting was associated with
improved economic performance. For the ten-year averaged data,
external patenting in the United States generally was associated with
123. Out of curiosity, I did check whether the creation of the Federal Circuit changed
the relationship between patenting and per capita income by dividing the ten-year data
covering 1966-2005 into pre- and post-Federal Circuit periods (1966-1985 and 1986-2005).
However, whether I estimated equation (7a) separately with the pre- and post-Federal
Circuit data, or estimated a difference in difference model for the pre- and post-Federal
Circuit time periods, no statistically significant difference existed in the patenting
coefficients in the pre- and post-Federal Circuit eras.
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improved economic performance. This may suggest that time is
required for the benefits of a patented innovation to spread. In either
case, however, the positive correlation between external patenting
and economic performance is consistent with the hypothesis that
TRIPs represents a mutually welfare-enhancing free trade measure.
1518 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87
